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ABSTRACT 
We examine the effect of stock liquidity on accruals-based earnings management. 
Finance literature suggests that stock liquidity leads to price efficiency. If prices are efficient, 
more future earnings should be reflected in current prices. Therefore, gain from shifting accruals 
across periods should be low and managers should have less incentive to manage earnings. We 
find that higher stock liquidity is associated with higher future earnings response coefficient and 
lower accruals-based earnings management. Our finding has important implication for the 
decline in accruals-based earnings management during 2001-2005 documented in prior study. 
Our additional trend analysis suggests that instead of SOX and other concurrent events, price 
efficiency improvement resulting from microstructure regime shifting (e.g., reduction in tick size 
from $1/16 to $1/100) may drive the decline in accruals-based earnings management during the 
period of 2001-2005. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we examine the effect of stock liquidity on price efficiency and accruals-based 
earnings management (AEM). In the finance literature, both theories and empirical findings 
suggest that stock liquidity contributes to stock price efficiency. That is, as stock liquidity 
increases stock prices become more informative about firms’ economic fundamentals. In line 
with the role of stock liquidity in enhancing price efficiency, we hypothesize that as stock 
liquidity increases stock prices exhibit greater capability of reflecting future earnings (H1). We 
argue that the price efficiency-enhancing effect of stock liquidity has important implication for 
AEM. Specifically we argue that stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency dampen certain 
motives for firms and/or their managers to engage in AEM. We hypothesize that as stock 
liquidity increases and thus stock prices better reflect future earnings, firms will engage in less 
AEM.  
We use the high-low stock liquidity measure proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012). We 
choose the high-low stock liquidity measure proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) because this 
high-low stock liquidity measure exhibits several desirable attributes (see Corwin and Schultz 
2012). First, this high-low stock liquidity measure has strong theoretical foundation. Corwin and 
Schultz (2012) developed this high-low liquidity measure on the basis of two simple 
uncontroversial empirical regularities. Second, Corwin and Schultz (2012) showed that this high-
low measure outperforms other popular low-frequency measures in capturing cross-sections of 
both spread levels and month-to-month changes in spreads. We argue that it is a highly desirable 
feature for any low-frequency liquidity measure to possess high cross-section correlations with 
liquidity measures computed from high-frequency intraday transaction level data, especially 
when the low-frequency liquidity measure is used in cross-section regression. Third, this high-
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low stock liquidity measure is less computationally complex and demanding, compared than 
other stock liquidity measures. In our main test, we adopt the modified Jones model proposed in 
Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate levels of normal and discretionary accruals. Following Hribar 
and Collins’s (2002) suggestion, we adopt the cash-flow approach to the calculation of total 
accruals.  
To test H1, we adopt the model proposed in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) as our main regression 
model. Because of the panel nature of our data we use two-way clustered standard errors (i.e. 
clustered on both firm and year) to calculate test statistics. We find that future earnings 
coefficients increase as stock liquidity increases, suggesting that stock prices exhibit greater 
capability of reflecting future earnings as stock liquidity increases. In our robustness analysis, we 
use the model proposed in Lundholm and Myers (2002) and obtain essentially the same result. 
To test H2, we adapt the regression model used in Cohen et al. (2008). One important 
outcome of our study is the provision of a market efficiency-based explanation to the finding that 
accruals-based earning management increased steadily from 1987 and started to decline after the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 documented in Cohen et al. (2008). Adoption 
of the regression model used in Cohen et al. (2008) ensures that our study is directly comparable 
to Cohen et al. (2008). Robustness analysis shows that our finding about the relationship between 
stock liquidity and AEM may not be driven by omitted correlated variables and reversal causality. 
In our additional analysis, we examine the trends of stock liquidity and discretionary accruals 
during 1989 – 2010. In line with our cross-sectional finding about the dampening effect of stock 
liquidity on AEM, we find that variations in the magnitude of AEM over time are closely related 
to variations in the overall stock liquidity over time as implied in our H2. Our findings suggest 
that besides SOX and other concurrent events price efficiency improvement resulting from 
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microstructure regime shifting (e.g. reduction in tick size from $1/16 to $1/100) may drive the 
decline in AEM during the period of 2002-2005 documented in Cohen et al. (2008). In other 
words, our study provides a capital market efficiency-based explanation of the decline in AEM 
during the period of 2002-2005 documented in Cohen et al., (2008). 
Our study contributes to the literature at least in four aspects. First, our study provides direct 
evidence that stock liquidity and thus price efficiency influence managers’ decisions on AEM. It 
has been long theoretically acknowledged that accounting choices including AEM play no 
substantive role in a complete and perfect market (see Fields et al. 2001). Our finding about the 
dampening effect of stock liquidity on AEM lends empirical support to the theoretical 
acknowledgement of the importance of capital market efficiency in managers’ decisions on 
accounting choices, suggesting that future research on accounting choices may need to explicitly 
take capital market efficiency into account in research design. 
Second, our findings add to research that examines the real effects of capital market 
efficiency. Existing research on the real effects of capital market efficiency has examined a 
variety of issues ranging from price discovery and formation to corporate governance (see Bond 
et al. Forthcoming). For instance, the work of Fama and Jensen (i.e., Fama 1980; Fama and 
Jensen 1983a,b) suggests that when stock prices timely, un-biasedly reflect the impact of 
managers’ decisions on net cash flows, stock markets together with product markets and 
managerial labor markets can serve as a governance mechanism for disciplining managers; 
Ferreira et al. (2011) find that stock price informativeness affects the structure of corporate 
boards; Edmans et al. (2011) find that stock liquidity encourages the formation of blockholdings 
and shapes blockholders’ governance preference. In our knowledge, our study is among the first 
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empirical work that shows that stock liquidity and thus price efficiency discourage firms and 
their managers from engaging in AEM. 
Third, our study provides a market efficiency explanation of the decline in AEM during the 
period of 2002-2005 first documented in Cohen et al. (2008). Our finding suggests that the 
decline in AEM during the period of 2002-2005 may not be driven only by the passage of SOX 
and other concurrent events but may also be caused by overall improved stock liquidity and thus 
price efficiency. Given that one of the main purposes of SOX is to curb opportunistic earnings 
management and compliance with SOX is very costly, our finding suggests that we may need to 
reevaluate the impact of SOX.  
Fourth, our finding that higher stock liquidity is associated with higher FERC lends macro-
level support to the positive effect of stock liquidity on price efficiency. Prior studies (e.g. 
Chordia et al. 2008) infer the effect of liquidity on price efficiency from micro-level price 
attributes such as short-term return predictability from order flows, proximity to random walk 
benchmarks, and return autocorrelations. Compared with micro-level evidence, our macro-level 
evidence is directly in line with theoretical predictions about the effect of liquidity on price 
efficiency (see Holmstrom and Tirole 1993).  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we first review literature about the 
effect of stock liquidity on price efficiency. Then we develop our hypotheses. In section 3, we 
describe our measures of stock liquidity and discretionary accruals, the regression models used to 
test our hypotheses, and estimation techniques. In section 4, we describe our data sources and 
sample, and report the summary statistics of variables used to test the effect of stock liquidity on 
AEM. In section 5, we report and discuss the results of our analyses including robustness, 
causality, and additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Stock Liquidity and Price Efficiency 
Prices formed through market mechanisms aggregate information possessed by market 
participants about the value of traded assets (Hayek, 1945). Specifically, in stock markets 
investors with diverse pieces of information trade with each other and endeavor to profit from 
their private information. Arising from trades between investors, stock prices aggregate these 
different pieces of information and reflect investors’ overall expectations of the value of firms’ 
stocks (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Hellwig 1980). Moreover, there exist wide variations, both 
cross-sectional and inter-temporal, in the efficiency of stock prices (see Boehmer and Kelley 
2009; Chordia et al. 2008). Stock price efficiency refers to the extent to which stock prices are 
informative about the economic fundamentals of traded stocks (Bond et al., Forthcoming). The 
microstructure of stock markets significantly influences stock price efficiency (Madhavan 2000; 
O’Hara 2003). Liquidity is among the most important aspects of stock market microstructure that 
have first-order effects on price efficiency (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993; O’Hara 2003). Liquidity 
is embodied in investors’ capability of trading a large number of stocks quickly at low cost with 
little price impact (Liu 2006). 
The research in economics and finance has identified a variety of closely related channels 
through which stock liquidity contributes to stock price efficiency. First, improvement in stock 
liquidity increases the marginal value of information and thus motivates market participants to 
acquire private information about firms’ fundamental value (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993). The 
most direct effect of improvement in stock liquidity is the reduction in trading costs and hence 
increases trading profits from private information. Furthermore, improvement in liquidity makes 
it easier for an informed investor to disguise his private information and profit from it regardless 
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of whether his private information is strategic (i.e. intervention-related) or is simply speculative 
(i.e. trading-oriented) (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993; Kyle and Vila 1991; Maug 1998). Moreover, 
improvement in stock liquidity lowers the threshold for the value of information upon which 
investors can profitably trade. In summary, the improvement in stock liquidity not only results in 
the increase in trading profits from private information and therefore incites more market 
participants to become privately informed, but also enlarges the set of information that can be 
impounded into prices through trading. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that price efficiency 
increases as the number of informed investors and/or the quality of information increase. In 
addition, stock liquidity facilitates trading between investors and thus accelerates the impounding 
of private information into stock prices.  
Second, several theoretical papers suggest that stock liquidity encourages the formation 
of blockholdings (i.e., Kyle and Vila 1991; Edmans 2009; Maug 1998). During takeover bids, 
blockholders that initiate takeover bids face potential free-ride on the improvement after 
acquisition from existing shareholders if existing shareholders are aware that they are selling to 
raiders (Grossman and Hart 1980). Kyle and Vila (1991) show that liquidity allows blockholders 
to camouflage their purchases by pooling with noise traders and therefore acquire large block of 
shares at favorable prices. Similarly, Maug (1998) shows that liquidity encourages investors to 
intervene because a liquid stock market makes it less costly to hold large stakes and makes it 
easier to purchase additional shares at prices that do not incorporate the full gains from 
intervention. In a trading model, Edmans (2009) shows that blockholders optimally choose 
higher initial stakes if stock liquidity is higher because higher stock liquidity offers blockholders 
greater ability to sell shares upon negative information. The work of Edmans et al. (2011) and 
Gerken (2011) provides empirical evidence that supports the positive relationship between stock 
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liquidity and formation of blockholdings. Using a sample of U.S. external blockholdings from 
1994-2005 Gerken (2011) finds that liquidity increases the likelihood of block formation; 
focusing on hedge fund blockholders Edmans et al. (2011) find that hedge funds are more likely 
to acquire blocks in liquid firms than in illiquid firms. 
1
 
Blockholders generally have superior information. Because of the large amount that 
blockholders can sell upon negative information, blockholders have incentives to become 
informed (Edmans 2009). In other words, the utility of information is higher to blockholders 
because blockholders can make greater use of it. Because quality information acquisition incurs 
fixed costs such as investment in research databases, blockholders will only acquire information 
on large ownership stakes (Boehmer and Kelley 2009). Moreover, blockholders have greater 
access to management and/or have better abilities to acquire information and conduct quality 
fundamental analysis due to economies of scale and resources at their discretion (Bhushee and 
Goodman 2007).  
Prior studies provide empirical evidence that confirms the information superiority of 
blockholders. Blockholders are generally institutional investors. Bhushee and Goodman (2007) 
find that the private information content of trades by institutional investors does increase with 
institutional investors’ stakes in a firm. Event-related studies show that institutional investors sell 
their stakes in advance of events associated with poor performance such as value-destructive 
mergers (Chen et al. 2007) and forced CEO turnovers (Parrino et al. 2003). Campbell, et al. 
(2009) use a sophisticated method to infer daily institutional trading behavior from TAQ 
database of NYSE and find that institutions anticipate earnings surprises and post-earnings 
                                                          
1
 Both Edmans et al. (2011) and Gerken (2011) adopt the instrument variable approach to ensure 
the validity of their causality inferences about the positive relationship between stock liquidity 
and the likelihood of block formation. 
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announcement drift. In line with Campbell et al. (2009), Ke and Petroni (2004) show that 
transient institutions predict the break in a string of consecutively earnings increases at least one 
quarter in advance of the break quarter; Bartov et al. (2000) document a negative relationship 
between institutional holdings and post-announcement abnormal returns; Ke and 
Ramalingegowda (2005) find that transient institutional investors exploit the post-earnings 
announcement drift; Collins et al. (2003) show that the presence of institutional investors 
mitigates the magnitude of negative returns associated with accruals. More importantly, liquidity 
enables and even encourages blockholders to trade on their private information (Edmans 2009; 
Edmans et al. 2011). 
Third, liquidity stimulates speculation-based arbitrage. Speculation-based arbitrage 
involves taking a long-position in undervalued stocks and/or a short-position in overvalued 
stocks. Arbitrage traders are generally well-informed (Boehmer et al. 2008). For instance, 
Karpoff and Lou (2010) find that abnormal short interest increases steadily in the nineteen 
months before financial misrepresentation is publicly revealed, suggesting that short sellers can 
detect firms that misrepresent their financial statements. Therefore, arbitrage trading contributes 
to the convergence of prices and fundamental values and improves price efficiency (see Saffi and 
Sigurdsson 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2011). However, arbitrage trading is both costly and risky 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; O’Hara 2003). By directly reducing trading costs and enabling 
investors to change holding positions at prices that do not fully reflect their private information, 
liquidity increases the profits of arbitrage trading. In practice, taking a short-position in 
overvalued stocks is generally more costly than taking a long-position in undervalued stocks. By 
encouraging the formation of blockholdings and thus increasing the availability of shares for 
borrowing by short arbitrageurs (Nagel 2005;  Hirshleifer et al. 2011), liquidity can reduce costs 
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associated with short arbitrage. By facilitating trading and speeding the convergence of stock 
prices and fundamental values, liquidity can reduce risks associated with arbitrage such as 
liquidity risk.  
Chordia et al. (2008) provide micro-level evidence that stock liquidity contributes to 
stock price efficiency. Market microstructure research shows that reduction in the minimum tick 
size leads to improvement in stock liquidity (Bessembinder 2003; Chordia et al. 2005). Using 
intraday transaction data for stocks that were traded every day at NYSE during the period of 
1993 to 2002, Chordia et al. (2008) examine whether stock price efficiency differs across three 
different liquidity regimes: (i) January 4, 1993 – June 23, 1997 when the minimum tick size is 
$1/8; (ii) June 24, 1997 – January 28, 2001 when the minimum tick size is $1/16; and (iii) 
January 29, 2001 – December 3, 2002 when the minimum tick size is $1/100.  
Finance research uses two ways for quantifying price efficiency. Consistent with the 
notion of efficient markets (Fama 1970), the first way uses the lack of return predictability as the 
criterion for efficiency. However, market microstructure research acknowledges that even when 
markets are semi-strong prices can reflect varying degrees of private information (Kyle 1985). 
Therefore, the market microstructure literature uses the amount of information reflected in prices 
as the criterion for efficiency. Consistent with the first way of measuring price efficiency, 
Chordia et al. (2008) use short-horizon return predictability from order flows as their measure for 
price inefficiency and use variance ratio tests to examine the degree to which prices are close to 
random walk benchmark. Chordia et al. (2008) find that short-horizon return predictability from 
order flows was lower and prices were closer to random walk benchmarks during more liquid 
regimes suggesting that liquidity stimulates arbitrage activity. In line with the microstructure 
way of measuring price efficiency, Chordia et al. (2008) use open-close/close-open return 
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variance ratio and return autocorrelations to measure price efficiency. Chordia et al. (2008) find 
that open-close/close-open return variance ratios were higher and return autocorrelations were 
smaller during more liquid regimes, suggesting that more private information is incorporated into 
prices during more liquid regimes. 
To sum up, stock liquidity increases the marginal value of private information and thus 
motivates market participants to engage in private information production; stock liquidity 
encourages the formation of blockholdings; and stock liquidity stimulates speculation-based 
arbitrage. Therefore, stock liquidity enlarges the proportion of investors who are informed, 
increases both the quality and quantity of information that can be incorporated into prices, and 
accelerates the impounding of information into prices and thus the convergence of prices and 
values. All these effects contribute to stock price efficiency (see Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). 
Moreover, micro-level evidence supports the empirical validity of the positive effect of stock 
liquidity on stock price efficiency. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
Stock prices reflect future earnings and thus lead current-period earnings (Kothari and 
Sloan 1992). Both economic and accounting reasons underlie the empirical regularity that price 
lead earnings: (i) current-period earnings have limited capability of measuring firms’ 
fundamental value simply because operational and strategic decisions made by managers have 
both short-term and long-term impacts on firms’ profitability (Barney 1991); and (ii) earnings 
lack of timeliness because of objectivity, verifiability, and conservatism conventions underling 
the accounting measurement process (Collins et al. 1994).  
In theory, Ohlson (1995) shows that if there were no market frictions stock prices could 
be expressed as a function of current book value of equity and future earnings. In reality, stock 
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prices vary widely in their ability to accurately reflect the fundamental value of the underlying 
equity. Evident in our review of the literature on how stock liquidity contributes to stock price 
efficiency, as stock liquidity improves stock prices will more faithfully capture the fundamental 
value of the underlying equity (also see Holmstrom and Tirole 2002). Holding everything else 
(e.g. the required cost of equity capital) equal, the relationship between stock prices and future 
earnings should increase with stock liquidity. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the higher stock liquidity the stronger the relationship between stock prices 
and future earnings. 
Anecdotal cases, survey of executives, and findings of archival research suggest that 
managers engage in earnings management (Dechow et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2005; Healy and 
Palepu 2003). A variety of motives underlie firms’ and their managers’ earnings management 
decisions such as avoidance of debt covenant violations, evasion of regulatory intervention, 
manipulation of market participants’ perceptions, communication of inside information,  and 
maximization of management compensations (Fields et al. 2001;  Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency have important implication for firms’ and their 
managers’ earnings management behavior. We argue that stock liquidity and ensuing stock price 
efficiency dampen some of these motives underlying firms’ and their managers’ earnings 
management decisions and therefore temper firms’ and their managers’ earnings management 
behavior. 
Among the most often cited motives underlying managers’ earnings management 
decisions is the manipulation of investors’ perceptions of firms’ economic fundamentals (Fields 
et al. 2001; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Managers’ concerns with investors’ perceptions mainly 
stem from several interrelated regularities. Most importantly, investors’ perceptions of firms’ 
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economic fundamentals shape their expectations about the magnitude, timing, and risk of firms’ 
future cash flows and thus affect stock prices. Stock prices determine shareholders’ wealth. 
Therefore, stock price performance is a critical input to shareholders’ and directors’ decisions 
regarding managers’ welfare such as promotion, compensation, and job security. Furthermore, 
the value and mobility of managers’ human capital, especially those of members of top 
management team, increases with the stock performance of firms for which these managers work. 
In addition, managers generally hold their firms’ equity such as common and restricted stocks 
and stock options as a result of equity-based compensation and/or voluntary trade of their firms’ 
equity. Therefore, managers’ wealth is positively linked to the stock performance of their firms.  
The findings of prior studies suggest that, at least to some extent, managers succeed in 
manipulating investors’ perceptions of their firms’ economic fundamentals through earnings 
management. For instance, Bartov et al. (2002) found that firms that resort to earnings 
management to meet or beat analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) command a valuation 
premium compared with firms that do not engage in earnings management and fail to MBE. 
Findings with implications similar to Bartov et al.’s (2002) are provided in Barth et al. (1999), 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002), and Skinner and Sloan (2002).  
We argue that stock liquidity affects the extent to which managers succeed in 
manipulating investors’ perceptions of their firms’ economic fundamentals and thus achieving 
desired stock prices. Evident in our literature review, as stock liquidity improves stock prices 
will more faithfully capture the fundamental value of underlying equity. In other words, as stock 
liquidity improves and consequently stock prices become more informative about firms’ 
economic fundamentals, stock prices will become less sensitive to managers’ earnings 
management because investors as a whole will possess higher ability to “see through” accounting 
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choices made by managers. In the absence of stock price responses to their earnings management, 
managers will have less motivation to engage in earnings management in the first place (Edmans 
2009; Fields et al. 2001). Therefore, as stock liquidity improves and consequently stock prices 
become more informative about the economic fundamentals of firms, managers should engage in 
less earnings management. 
 Another channel through which stock liquidity and ensuing stock price efficiency 
dampen firms’ and their managers’ incentives for earnings management arises from the effect of 
stock liquidity and ensuing stock price efficiency on compensation practices and structures. 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) theoretically demonstrated that as liquidity increases and 
consequently trade prices become more informative regarding the fundamental value of 
underlying assets at the equilibrium level firms should optimally increase the sensitivity of 
managers’ pay to price levels. Empirical research guided by the theoretical lens of Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1993) provides evidence consistent the theoretical prediction of Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1993). For instance, Jayaraman and Milbourn (Forthcoming) found that CEO’s pay-for-
performance sensitivity with respect to stock prices is increasing in the liquidity of the stock 
(also see Fang et al. 2009; Kang and Liu 2008). Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Jiang et al. 
2010), Jayaraman and Milbourn (Forthcoming) measured pay-for-performance sensitivity as the 
dollar change in the value of the manager’ stock and option holdings arising from a one 
percentage increase in the company’s stock price. 
Furthermore, stock liquidity and ensuing stock price efficiency affects the relative 
weights of accounting-based performance measures and stock returns in firms’ and their 
directors’ decisions about top executives’ annual compensation. Banker and Datar (1989) 
theoretically demonstrated that at the optimal level firms and their directors should assign greater 
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weights to performance measures with relatively higher sensitivity-to-noise ratio in their 
decisions about managers’ annual compensation. As stock liquidity increases, stock prices 
become more responsive to managers’ value-creation efforts in a less biased way. Therefore, a 
direct empirical implication of Banker and Datar’s (1989) work is that as stock liquidity 
increases and consequently stock prices become more efficient firms and their directors should 
assign greater weights to stock returns in their decisions about managers’ annual compensation. 
Consistent with the theoretical prediction of Banker and Datar (1989) David et al. (2011) 
documented a positive association between CEO’s and top-paid executives’ total annual 
compensation and the interaction term between stock liquidity and stock returns.  
In summary, as stock liquidity increases and consequently stock prices become more 
efficient both managers’ “stock” of wealth and “flows” to managers’ wealth not only increase 
with stock price levels but also become more sensitive to stock price levels. Both value-creation 
and earnings management decisions consume managers’ cognition and attention. However, 
managerial cognition and attention are strategically scarce (Ocasio 1997). Therefore, managers 
have to optimally allocate their cognition and attention between value creation and earnings 
management. As stock liquidity increases, stock prices become more responsive to managers’ 
value-creation efforts in a less biased way on the one hand, and become less responsive to 
managers’ earnings management on the other hand. Therefore, we argue that as stock liquidity 
increases and consequently stock prices become more efficient managers should have less 
incentive to engage in earnings management, and have greater motivation to put more efforts in 
value creation (also see Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011).  
Stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency also affect the demand for communication of 
private information through earnings management by managers. Managers manage reported 
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earnings to communicate their private information to shareholders and other market participants 
possibly because institutional and legal constraints and/or lack of a credible channel prevent 
managers from disclosing such private information (Demski and Sappington 1987; Schipper 
1989; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). On the one hand, as stock liquidity increases, stock prices 
become a good signal that summarizes the implications of managerial decisions for current and 
future net cash flows more timely in a less biased manner (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983b). 
On the other hand, as evident in our literature review, both theoretical work and empirical 
evidence suggest that stock liquidity encourages the formation of large blockholders and 
increases the proportion of shares controlled by sophisticated, large institutional investors. Large 
institutional shareholders generally have greater access to management and/or have greater 
incentive and better abilities to acquire information and conduct quality fundamental analysis. In 
summary, as stock liquidity increases, the demand for communication of private information 
through earnings management by managers should decrease. 
To sum up, as stock liquidity increases and consequently stock prices become more 
efficient, firms and their managers will engage in less earnings management because (i) firms 
and their managers find it increasingly difficult to manipulate market participants’ perceptions of 
firms’ economic fundamentals through earnings management; (ii) both managers’ “stock” of 
wealth and “flow” to managers’ wealth increases with the amount of efforts that managers put in 
value creation; and (iii) there is less demand for communication of managers’ private 
information through earnings management.  
Real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management are the two 
prevalent earnings management strategies (Badertscher 2011; Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 
Forthcoming). AEM involves altering accounting methods or estimates used to present a 
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transaction in financial statements while real activities manipulation involves changing the 
timing or structuring of an operation, investment or financing transaction (Zang Forthcoming). 
Compared with real activities manipulation, AEM possesses several characteristics that make its 
use more sensitive to stock price efficiency. First, AEM has no direct impact on firms’ cash 
flows. Moreover, accruals reverse with respect to their impact on reported earnings. Therefore, 
presuming that our first hypothesis is supported, we can see that managers will have less 
incentive to engage in AEM when stock liquidity improves and consequently stock prices have 
stronger relationship with future earnings. Furthermore, AEM is subject to greater scrutiny by 
outsiders such as auditors and regulators than real activities manipulation (Cohen et al. 2008; 
Zang Forthcoming). Accounting fraud cases against managers generally refer to managerial 
misbehaviors in AEM (see Dechow et al. 2011). In addition, it is very challenging for outsiders 
to distinguish real activities manipulations from real activities decisions. However, findings of 
prior studies (e.g., Hirshleifer et al. 2011; Karpoff and Lou 2010) and anecdotal examples (e.g., 
Einhorn 2008; Schilit and Perler 2010) suggest that short arbitrageurs sometimes could detect 
AEM. We argue that the negative impact of stock liquidity on earnings management is stronger 
for AEM than for real activities manipulation. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the higher stock liquidity managers engage in less accruals-based earnings 
management. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Proxy for AEM 
Consistent with existing literature (e.g. Badertscher 2011; Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 
Forthcoming), we use discretionary accruals to proxy for AEM. Discretionary accruals are the 
difference between total accruals and normal accruals. We adopt the modified Jones model 
proposed in Dechow et al., (1995) to estimate normal accruals. The modified Jones model is as 
follows: 
      
      
      
 
      
     
             
      
     
      
      
          
Where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TAC is the earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (COMPUSTAT: ibc) minus the operating cash flows from continuing 
operations taken from the statement of cash flows (COMPUSTAT: oancf – COMPUSTAT: 
xidoc) (see Hribar and Collins 2002); A is total assets (COMPUSTAT: at); S is net sale 
(COMPUSTAT: sale); REC is the accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT: rect); PPE is the gross 
value of property, plant, and equipment (COMPUSTAT: ppegt); Δ standards for change from 
fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
For each year, we estimate the regression equation (1) for every industry classified by 
two-digit SIC codes. Therefore, our estimation approach controls for industry-wide changes in 
economic conditions that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time. 
Furthermore, we require that the minimal number of observations is fifteen. Our measure of 
discretionary accruals is the estimated residuals of regression equation (1). 
3.2 Stock Liquidity Measure 
In our main test of H2, we adopt the stock liquidity measure proposed in Corwin and 
Schultz (2012). We choose the high-low stock liquidity measure proposed in Corwin and Schultz 
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(2012) because this high-low stock liquidity measure exhibits several desirable attributes (see 
Corwin and Schultz 2012). First, this high-low stock liquidity measure has strong theoretical 
foundation. Corwin and Schultz (2012) developed this high-low liquidity measure on the basis of 
two simple uncontroversial empirical regularities. Namely, daily high prices are always buyer-
initiated while daily low prices are always seller-initiated. Therefore, the ratio of high-to-low 
prices reflect both the fundamental volatility of the stock and the stock’s bid-ask spread. , the 
component of the high-to-low price ratio attributed to fundamental volatility increase 
proportionately with the trading interval while the component attributed to bid-ask spreads stay 
relatively constant over a short period.  
Second, Corwin and Schultz (2012) showed that this high-low measure outperforms other 
popular low-frequency measures in capturing cross-sections of both spread levels and month-to-
month changes in spreads (see Table IV of Corwin and Schultz 2012). We argue that it is a 
highly desirable feature for any low-frequency liquidity measure to possess high cross-section 
correlations with liquidity measures computed from high-frequency intraday transaction level 
data, especially when the low-frequency liquidity measure is used in cross-section reression. 
Third, this high-low stock liquidity measure is less computationally complex and demanding, 
compared than other stock liquidity measures. Appendix 2 provides brief technical details of 
Corwin and Schultz’s (2012) high-low approach to estimating effective spread and the other two 
low-frequency liquidity measures used in the robustness tests.  
3.3 Regression Model for Testing H1 
We follow the method proposed in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) as our main regression 
model for testing H1. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) adopt this regression model from Collins et al. 
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(1994). When testing H1, we refer to both the simplified and the complete versions of the 
regression model. The two versions of the regression model are as follow: 
                                          ∑             ∑    
   
   
   
   
                             ∑                            
   
     
                                          ∑             ∑    
   
   
   
   
                             ∑                            
   
     
Where, for fiscal year t and firm i,  
RETi,t+j = annualized stock return that starts from the fourth month after the end of fiscal 
year t+j-1, j=0, 1, 2, 3. 
ΔEi,t+j =   change in income before extraordinary items from fiscal year t+j-1 to fiscal year 
t+j scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t+j,  j=0, 
1, 2, 3. 
E/Pi,t = the ratio of income before extraordinary items of fiscal year t to the market value 
of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
AGi,t = growth rate of total assets from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
LMVi,t = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
LIQi,t = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimate of bid-ask spread 
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 trading 
days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 1 provides the details.  
 
Our H1 predicts that γj > 0, j=1, 2, 3. The regression model includes at most three future 
years’ earnings changes because Kothari and Sloan (1992) show that the relation between prices 
and future earnings is generally not statistically significant when the time lag between prices and 
earnings is greater than three years. The use of actual future earnings changes introduces 
measurement error because the theoretically sound regressors should be expected future earnings 
changes but expected future earnings changes are practically unobservable (Collins et al. 1994). 
Collins et al. (1994) suggest that inclusion of future returns can mitigate downward bias 
associated with the use of actual future earnings changes because the dependent variable (RETi,t) 
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are approximately unrelated with future stock returns (RETi,t+j) but future stock returns are 
correlated with unexpected future earnings changes. Inclusion of the earnings-price ratio (E/Pi,t) 
and the concurrent asset growth can help further mitigate the measurement error problem 
because these two constructs serve as expectations for future earnings . Inclusion of firm size 
(LMVEi,t) is to control for the impact of variation in firms’ overall information environment 
because prior studies find that large firms tend to have richer information environment than small 
firms and thus stock prices of large firms will incorporate future earnings news more timely than 
those of small firms (Collins and Kothari 1989).  
3.4 Regression Model for Testing H2 
To test H2, we adapt the regression model used in Cohen et al. (2008). One important 
implication of our finding about H2 is the provision of a market efficiency-based explanation to 
the finding that AEM increased steadily from 1987 and started to decline after the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 first documented in Cohen et al. (2008). Adoption of the 
regression model used in Cohen et al. (2008) ensures that our study is directly comparable to 
Cohen et al. (2008). Moreover, our finding regarding H2 still holds after incorporation of a 
comprehensive list of additional control variables including firm- and industry-fixed effects into 
the original regression model. 
Slightly different from Cohen et al. (2008), in our main test of H2 we use discretionary 
accruals (DA) as the dependent variable while Cohen et al. (2008) used the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ADA). We believe that the extent to which total accruals deviate from 
expected normal accruals represents the level of AEM regardless of the direction of deviation. 
The findings of prior studies suggest that firms and their managers do resort to income-
increasing discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward for a variety of reasons such as 
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meeting or beating earnings expectations (e.g. Bartov et al. 2002). Income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals don’t necessarily only reflect the reversal of income-increasing 
discretionary accruals occurring in prior periods. Under a variety of contexts, firms and/or their 
managers also have motives to resort to income-decreasing discretionary accruals to manage 
earnings downward. For instance, Perry and Williams’s (1994) finding suggests that managers 
tended to reduce reported earnings prior to the public announcement of managerial buyout 
proposal; the findings of a number of research papers suggest that when under regulatory 
scrutiny firms and their managers tended to manage earnings downward through AEM (see 
Cahan 1992; Jones 1991); the findings of a number of studies (e.g. Pourciau 1993) suggest that 
incoming CEOs have incentives manage earnings downward through income-decreasing DA to 
increase reported earnings in the following year and thus enhance the incoming CEOs’ 
reputation; the finding of Healy (1985) suggests that firms with cap on bonus awards are more 
likely to report accruals that defer income when the cap is reached than firms that have 
comparable performance but have no bonus cap (also see Holthausen et al. 1995). Therefore, we 
use the unsigned discretionary accruals as our dependent variable. 
Our H2 predicts a negative relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary 
accruals when discretionary accruals are income-increasing (i.e. DA > 0), and a positive 
relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals when discretionary accruals are 
income-decreasing (i.e. DA < 0). To accurately represent the relationships consistent with the 
prediction of H2, we include an indicator variable (DDA) that reflects the sign of discretionary 
accruals (i.e. DDA = 1 if DA > 0 and DDA = 0 if DA < 0), and interaction terms between this 
indicator variable and all other explanatory variables including our measure of stock liquidity in 
our regression equation used in the main test of H2. In addition, the way in which we set up the 
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regression model avoids imposition of the mechanical constraint that relationships between 
explanatory variables and discretionary accruals are constant regardless of the nature of 
discretionary accruals (i.e., income-increasing vs. income-decreasing). The regression model 
used in our main test is as follows: 
                                                      
                                           
                                         
                                               
                                               
                                           
                                          
                                        
                                         
                                              
                                             
                                            
                                          
                                          
                   
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones 
model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise. 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread 
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 
provides the details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 
8, and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to 
year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation 
and 1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 
2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater 
than or equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 
provides the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation 
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received by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the 
end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in 
fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by 
total outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t 
scaled by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the 
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal 
year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
 
H2 predicts that                      
3.5 Estimation Technique 
We apply OLS regression to estimate equation (2), (3) and (4). All datasets used in our 
analyses are panel data. Panel data generally exhibit cross-sectional (e.g. within-year) and serial 
(e.g., within-firm) correlations for variables of interest (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009; 
Thompson 2011). Presence of cross-sectional and serial correlations generally leads to violation 
of the common assumption of independence in regression errors and thus results in misspecified 
test statistics. Gow et al. (2010) show that failure to correct for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence produces misspecified test statistics in common accounting research settings. To 
ensure that our inferences are not confounded by misspecified test statistics induced by cross-
sectional and serial correlations, we follow the suggestion given in Gow et al. (2010), Petersen 
(2009) and Thompson (2011) to apply two-way cluster-robust standard errors to compute test 
statistics
2
. Specifically, we use standard errors clustered by firm and year to compute our test 
statistics. Gow et al., (2010) show that the two-way cluster-robust standard errors are robust to 
both serial and cross-sectional correlations (also see Cameron et al. 2008).  
                                                          
2
 We thank Dr. Petersen for generously making his STATA code for calculating two-way 
cluster-robust standard errors available online. 
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4. DATA, SAMPLE, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
To set up and estimate regression equation (1) – (4), we obtain financial, accounting, and 
auditor-related data from COMPUSTAT, stock-related data from CRSP, CEO and CFO 
compensation data from EXECCOMP, and GDP data from Bureau of Economic Analysis. In our 
robustness and causality tests, we obtain analysts-related data from I/B/E/S, institutional 
ownership data from Thomson CDA/Spectrum Institutional 13f Holdings, director-related and 
governance provisions data from RISKMETRICS, and marginal tax rate from Prof. John 
Graham
3
. 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Zang Forthcoming), we exclude financial (SIC 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) firms from our sample. To maximize statistical power and 
generalizability of our findings, we only require that a firm-year observation has no missing 
values for variables used in the test to be included in one test. Therefore, different tests will have 
different sample composition. In addition, in our analysis we exclude observations for which the 
values of ratio-type variables such as operating cycles and return on assets are in the top or 
bottom 0.5%. Panel A of Table 1 reports the year-by-year distribution of observations used in 
our main test of H2. 
For the sake of saving space, we only report summary statistics and correlations for 
variables used in the main test of H2 because of the centrality of H2 in our study
4
. Panel B of 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for variables in our main test of H2. Overall, variables 
used in our study to test H2 are comparable to those used in prior studies regarding statistical 
distributions (e.g. Cohen et al. 2008).  
                                                          
3
 We thank Dr. Gramham for generously making his marginal tax rate data available to us. 
4
 Summary statistics and correlations for variables used in other tests will be provided at request. 
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Panel C of Table 1 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations between variables used 
in our main test of H2. We are cautious about drawing inferences from correlations between 
discretionary accruals and other variables because of the inherent correlations between variables 
that represent either motives for earnings management or determinants of discretionary accruals. 
However, we want to provide a brief discussion of the correlation between stock liquidity 
measure and discretionary accrual. Consistent with the prediction of H2, the correlation between 
discretionary accruals and stock liquidity is positive when discretionary accruals are income-
decreasing (i.e., DA < 0), and negative when discretionary accruals are income-increasing (i.e., 
DA > 0). 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution 
 
Year N %
1992 609 3.04%
1993 853 4.25%
1994 936 4.66%
1995 987 4.92%
1996 1049 5.23%
1997 1122 5.59%
1998 1141 5.69%
1999 1104 5.50%
2000 1060 5.28%
2001 1077 5.37%
2002 1107 5.52%
2003 1142 5.69%
2004 1132 5.64%
2005 1085 5.41%
2006 1128 5.62%
2007 1165 5.81%
2008 1138 5.67%
2009 1128 5.62%
2010 1102 5.49%
Total 20065 100.00%
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics - Continued 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Pairwise Pearson (Spearman) Correlations in Upper (Lower) Triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Q1 Median Q3 N Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Q1 Median Q3 Diff
DA 9335 0.058 0.068 0.017 0.038 0.074 10730 -0.068 0.097 -0.083 -0.042 -0.019 0.126**
LIQ 9335 4.781 0.506 4.422 4.795 5.149 10730 4.724 0.528 4.354 4.737 5.109 0.056**
BIG 9335 0.957 0.203 1.000 1.000 1.000 10730 0.956 0.205 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.001    
ΔGDP 9335 2.782 1.797 1.900 3.000 4.100 10730 2.433 2.053 1.900 2.900 3.700 0.349**
LMV 9335 7.162 1.597 6.040 6.950 8.110 10730 7.132 1.617 6.011 6.970 8.124 0.030    
TIME 9335 9.052 5.127 5.000 9.000 13.000 10730 9.836 5.400 5.000 10.000 15.000 -0.784**
SCA 9335 0.122 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000 10730 0.093 0.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028**
SOX 9335 0.459 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 10730 0.544 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 -0.085**
RM 9335 0.050 0.441 -0.119 0.061 0.268 10730 -0.037 0.454 -0.218 0.000 0.192 0.087**
BONUS 9335 0.157 0.159 0.000 0.128 0.250 10730 0.142 0.154 0.000 0.100 0.234 0.016**
EX_OPT 9335 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.007 10730 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.000*  
UN_OPT 9335 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 10730 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000    
GRNT_OPT 9335 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 10730 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000**
OWNER 9335 0.020 0.050 0.001 0.003 0.013 10730 0.017 0.045 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.003**
DA > 0 DA < 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
DA (1) -0.20 -0.04 0.08 -0.11 -0.05 0.09 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10
LIQ (2) -0.19 0.11 0.18 0.40 -0.09 -0.17 0.00 0.08 0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.15 -0.08
BIG (3) -0.02 0.11 0.08 0.15 -0.10 0.04 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.08
ΔGDP (4) 0.08 0.11 0.07 -0.08 -0.56 0.00 -0.52 0.00 0.25 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08
LMV (5) -0.12 0.41 0.16 -0.09 0.21 -0.01 0.18 0.00 -0.01 -0.25 -0.16 -0.20 -0.17
TIME (6) -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.52 0.22 -0.04 0.86 0.06 -0.29 0.01 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12
SCA (7) 0.08 -0.17 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.34 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.00
SOX (8) -0.10 0.00 -0.09 -0.58 0.19 0.86 -0.34 0.05 -0.20 0.02 -0.07 -0.11 -0.12
RM (9) 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
BONUS (10) 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.26 0.01 -0.35 0.03 -0.25 -0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.13 0.05
EX_OPT (11) 0.03 -0.12 -0.03 0.00 -0.27 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.21 0.29 0.03
UN_OPT (12) 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.05 -0.14 0.00 0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.42 0.155 0.03
GRNT_OPT (13) 0.04 -0.11 0.02 0.08 -0.17 -0.06 0.12 -0.10 -0.01 -0.12 0.36 0.314 0.06
OWNER (14) 0.10 -0.15 -0.09 0.05 -0.31 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.16 0.05 0.02
DA > 0
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics – Continued 
 
Correlations Significantly Different from Zero at p-Values Less Than 0.05 Are in Boldface Type 
 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the year-by-year distribution of observations used to test H2. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used to test H2. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the pairwise Pearson/Spearman correlations between variables used to 
test H2. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones 
model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details. 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread 
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides 
the details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, 
and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year 
t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 
1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 
2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than 
or equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides 
the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation 
received by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
DA (1) 0.26 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.17 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01
LIQ (2) 0.27 0.10 0.26 0.46 -0.14 -0.17 -0.05 0.06 0.20 -0.11 -0.09 -0.15 -0.08
BIG (3) 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.15 -0.10 0.03 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.08
ΔGDP (4) 0.04 0.21 0.06 -0.02 -0.57 -0.01 -0.49 -0.05 0.28 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.06
LMV (5) 0.17 0.48 0.15 -0.03 0.14 -0.02 0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.25 -0.15 -0.21 -0.12
TIME (6) 0.01 -0.13 -0.10 -0.55 0.15 -0.08 0.87 0.08 -0.35 0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.11
SCA (7) -0.03 -0.17 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.35 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.01
SOX (8) 0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.56 0.14 0.86 -0.35 0.08 -0.25 0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.10
RM (9) 0.11 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05
BONUS (10) 0.08 0.22 0.01 0.31 0.04 -0.42 0.05 -0.30 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.14 0.04
EX_OPT (11) -0.07 -0.15 -0.04 -0.07 -0.26 0.14 0.03 0.16 -0.02 -0.07 0.22 0.27 0.00
UN_OPT (12) -0.06 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.39 0.09 0.00
GRNT_OPT (13) -0.10 -0.12 0.06 0.05 -0.16 -0.05 0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13 0.33 0.26 -0.01
OWNER (14) -0.04 -0.15 -0.09 -0.02 -0.28 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.17 0.07 -0.02
DA < 0
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics – Continued 
 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end 
of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OP
T 
= the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in 
fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_
OPT 
= the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled 
by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the 
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t 
scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1 H1: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient 
Following Aiken and West’s (1991) suggestion, we center our stock liquidity measure on 
its sample mean before we generate the interaction term between stock liquidity and changes in 
future earnings. Centering our stock liquidity measure on its sample mean makes regression 
coefficients on changes in future earnings empirically meaningful because in our sample stock 
liquidity measure is always positive (see Aiken and West 1991). Furthermore, centering our 
stock liquidity measure on its sample mean can mitigate potential collinearity problems 
associated with inclusion of interaction terms in the regression equation (see Aiken and West 
1991).  
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of equation (2) and (3). Consistent with the prediction 
of H1, the regression coefficients on the interaction terms between stock liquidity and changes in 
future earnings are positive, suggesting that as stock liquidity increases contemporaneous 
variations in stock prices will be more driven by changes in future earnings.  
Following Aiken and West’s (1991) suggestion we draw Figure 1 to illustrate how the 
regression coefficient on changes in future earnings (fiscal year t+1) varies with the magnitude of 
stock liquidity. From equation (2) we can get 
5
 
        
        
                             
Therefore, 
        ̂    ̂     ̂              
And 
                                                          
5
 Derivation is the same when referring to equation (3).  
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Table 2 
Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Gelb and Zarowin 2002) 
 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Table 2 reports the results of regression of contemporaneous annualized stock returns on the 
interaction term(s) between stock liquidity and changes in earnings and other control variables. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
RETt+j = annualized stock return that starts from the fourth month after the end of 
fiscal year t+j-1, j=0, 1, 2, 3. 
ΔEt+j =   change in income before extraordinary items from fiscal year t+j-1 to 
fiscal year t+j scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of 
fiscal year t+j,  j=0, 1, 2, 3. 
E/Pt = the ratio of income before extraordinary items of fiscal year t to the 
market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
Variables
Expected 
Sign
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept ? 0.182** 0.181**
E/Pt-1 + 0.733** 0.705**
AGt + 0.213** 0.210**
LMVt - -0.018** -0.019*  
RETt+1 - -0.140** -0.139**
RETt+2 - -0.044** -0.044**
RETt+3 - -0.064** -0.063**
ΔEt + 1.101** 1.101**
ΔEt+1 + 1.285** 1.389**
ΔEt+2 + 0.260** 0.300**
ΔEt+3 + 0.107*  0.127**
LIQt ? -0.001    
LIQt x ΔEt + -0.009    
LIQt x ΔEt+1 + 0.229**
LIQt x ΔEt+2 + 0.102*  
LIQt x ΔEt+3 + 0.051    
N 91644    91644    
R
2 0.143    0.145    
Dependent Variable - RETt
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Table 2 
Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Gelb and Zarowin 2002) – 
Continued 
 
AGt = growth rate of total assets from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
LMVt = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
LIQt = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimate of bid-ask spread 
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 1 provides 
the details.  
 
       (        ̂ )  √       ̂         ̂         
                         ̂   ̂      
We obtain   ̂ ,   ̂ ,        ̂,       ̂  and              ̂   ̂  from OLS estimates of 
equation (2). In our sample, the magnitude of stock liquidity ranges from 0.82 to 7.74. To draw 
Figure 1, we use the range of 0.50 to 8.0 to ensure that the value range of stock liquidity better 
represents the population. Figure 1 clearly shows that as stock liquidity increases the relationship 
between contemporaneous variations in stock prices and changes in future earnings strengthens. 
As evident in Figure 1, when stock liquidity is below certain value (about 2.0 in our sample) 
         is not statistically different from zero. In other words, when stock liquidity is very low 
(i.e., less than 2.0 in our sample) contemporaneous variations in stock prices convey no 
information about changes in future earnings (fiscal year t+1)
6
.  
5.2 H2: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals 
To gain first-hand insight into the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary 
accruals, we draw Figure 2 for a direct illustration of the relationship between stock liquidity and 
discretionary accruals. To draw Figure 2, we sort all observations with no missing values for 
both stock liquidity and discretionary accruals measures into five equal groups according to the 
                                                          
6
 For changes in earnings for fiscal year t+2 and t+3, we come to qualitatively the same 
conclusion after following the same procedure to draw figures. 
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magnitude of stock liquidity (larger group number means higher stock liquidity), and 
independently sort the same set of observations into two groups according to the sign of 
discretionary accruals. In total, 75003 firm-year observations are used to draw Figure 2 and 
36568 firm-year observations have positive discretionary accruals.  
Figure 2 exhibits several interesting patterns regarding the relationship between stock 
liquidity and discretionary accruals. First, consistent with the prediction of H2, Figure 2 reveals a 
positive relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals when discretionary 
accruals are negative, and a negative relationship when discretionary accruals are positive, 
suggesting that as stock liquidity increases and consequently stock prices become more efficient 
firms will engage in less AEM.  
 
Figure 1 
Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Gelb and Zarowin 2002) 
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Figure 2 
Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals: Cross-sectional Evidence 
 
Figure 2 depicts the cross-sectional relationship between stock liquidity and the magnitude and 
standard deviation of discretionary accruals. To draw Figure 2, we separate observations into two 
groups according to the sign of their discretionary accruals, and sort all observations into five 
equal groups according to the magnitude of stock liquidity.  
 
Second, the strength of the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals 
is stronger when discretionary accruals are negative than when discretionary accruals are positive. 
We argue that the differential strengths regarding the effect of stock liquidity on AEM may stem 
from the fact that it is more costly and risky for investors to engage in short arbitrage than in 
long arbitrage. Holding everything else equal, positive discretionary accruals are likely to cause 
overvaluation while negative discretionary accruals are likely to generate undervaluation. In the 
presence of overvaluation, arbitrage requires short sale of shares while in the presence of 
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undervaluation, arbitrage requires taking a long position. In practice, it is more costly and risky 
to engage in short arbitrage than in long arbitrage (Hirshleifer et al. 2011). Therefore, the effect 
of stock liquidity on price efficiency is less significant in the presence of resulting from income-
increasing AEM than in the presence of undervaluation brought about by income-decreasing 
AEM. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that the standard deviation of discretionary accruals declines 
as stock liquidity increases, suggesting that as stock liquidity increases and consequently prices 
become more efficient firms not only engage in less AEM but also engage in less extreme AEM. 
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of regression equation (4). Consistent with the 
prediction of our H2, the coefficient on stock liquidity is positive when discretionary accruals are 
negative, and negative when discretionary accruals are positive. Regardless of the sign of 
discretionary accruals, the regression coefficients on stock liquidity are statistically significant. 
Moreover, consistent with the pattern revealed in Figure 2, the absolute value of regression 
coefficient on stock liquidity when DA < 0 is greater than that on stock liquidity when DA > 0. 
Moreover, not only there is difference regarding the strength of the relationship between stock 
liquidity and AEM between DA < 0 and DA >0, but also the difference is statistically significant 
(i.e. p < 0.01).  Furthermore, the impact of stock liquidity on AEM is also economically 
significant. When stock liquidity increases from half standard deviation below the sample mean 
to half standard deviation above the sample mean, discretionary accruals will be reduced by 
0.013 (22.37% of the sample mean) when DA > 0; discretionary accruals will be increased by 
0.022 (33.58% of the sample mean ) when DA < 0. 
Our findings about other determinants of AEM are generally consistent with those of 
prior studies (e.g. Cohen et al. 2008). Here, in our interpretation of regression coefficients on 
other determinants of AEM we focus on coefficients that are statistically significant.  After 
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controlling for other determinants, the period after SOX was characterized by lower AEM, and 
the decrease in AEM mainly resulted from reduction in income-increasing AEM. As turned out 
in our sample, income-increasing AEM increases over time while there is no clear trend for 
income-decreasing AEM. We find no significant impact of Big 8 auditing firms on AEM while 
the sign of the regression coefficient on Big 8 is consistent with theoretical expectation (i.e. 
negative when DA > 0 and positive when DA < 0). The finding about firm size (LMV) is similar 
to that for Big 8. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) we find no significant direct evidence that 
AEM is greater during accounting scandal period (SCA = 1). We document a significant, 
positive relationship between REM and AEM when DA < 0 suggesting a substitution effect 
between AEM and REM when DA < 0. We find no significant relationship between REM and 
AEM when DA > 0. Different from Cohen et al. (2008) we document a significant positive 
relationship between change in real gross domestic product (ΔGDP) and AEM when DA > 0, 
suggesting that DA is higher when overall macroeconomic situation is better. 
We document a significant positive relationship between the average bonus awarded to 
CEO and CFO (BONUS) as percentage of total compensation and AEM when DA > 0 during 
pre-SCA and post-SOX periods, and no statistically significant during accounting scandal period 
(i.e. SCA = 1).  We find no statistically significant relationship between BONUS and AEM when 
DA < 0 during pre-SCA period, and statistically significant positive relationship between 
BONUS and AEM during SCA and post-SOX periods.
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Table 3 
Main Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals 
 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept -0.066** DDA 0.137** Intercept 0.070** -0.066**
BIG 0.001    DDA x BIG -0.008    BIG -0.006    0.001    
ΔGDP -0.001    DDA x ΔGDP 0.005** ΔGDP 0.003** -0.001    
LMV 0.001    DDA x LMV -0.001    LMV -0.000    0.001    
Time 0.000    DDA x Time 0.001    Time 0.002** 0.000    
SCA -0.007    DDA x SCA 0.013    SCA 0.005    -0.007    
SOX 0.003    DDA x SOX -0.022†  SOX -0.018** 0.003    
RM 0.032** DDA x RM -0.030** RM 0.002    0.032**
BONUS 0.023    DDA x BONUS -0.010    BONUS 0.013*  0.023    
BONUS x SCA 0.089    DDA x BONUS x SCA -0.108    BONUS x SCA -0.020    0.089    
BONUS x SOX 0.004    DDA x BONUS x SOX 0.009    BONUS x SOX 0.013    0.004    
UN_OPT -0.588    DDA x UN_OPT 1.647*  UN_OPT 1.059** -0.588    
UN_OPT x SCA -1.267    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA 2.250    UN_OPT x SCA 0.983    -1.267    
UN_OPT x SOX 0.736    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -2.171** UN_OPT x SOX -1.435** 0.736    
GRNT_OPT -0.673    DDA x GRNT_OPT 1.603    GRNT_OPT 0.930    -0.673    
GRNT_OPT x SCA 1.076    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -2.326*  GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.251†  1.076    
GRNT_OPT x SOX -0.155    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.512    GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.356    -0.155    
EX_OPT -0.192    DDA x EX_OPT 0.346    EX_OPT 0.154    -0.192    
EX_OPT x SCA 0.307    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA -0.719    EX_OPT x SCA -0.413    0.307    
EX_OPT x SOX 0.432    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX -0.485    EX_OPT x SOX -0.053    0.432    
OWNER 0.018    DDA x OWNER 0.100†  OWNER 0.118** 0.018    
OWNER x SCA 0.144*  DDA x OWNER x SCA -0.176*  OWNER x SCA -0.032    0.144*  
OWNER x SOX 0.071    DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.148*  OWNER x SOX -0.077†  0.071    
LIQ 0.044** DDA x LIQ -0.069** LIQ -0.025** 0.044**
N 20065    
R
2
0.412    
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Table 3 
Main Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results of the main test of H2. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). 
Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise. 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the 
details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if 
otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm 
in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at 
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO 
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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 We documented no significant relationship between the average options granted to CEO 
and CFO (GRNT_OPT) as percentage of total outstanding shares and AEM when DA > 0 during 
pre-SCA and SCA periods even though the drop in the strength of the relationship between 
GRNT_OPT and AEM when DA > 0 is negative and marginally significant. During post-SOX 
period, the relationship between GRNT_OPT and AEM is positive and marginally statistically 
significant when DA > 0. We find a statistically significant negative relationship between 
GRNT_OPT and AEM when DA < 0 during post-SOX period, and no statistically significant 
relationship during pre-SCA and SCA periods.  
We document no significant relationship between the average exercisable stock options 
held by CEO and CFO (EX_OPT) as percentage of total outstanding shares and AEM regardless 
of the sign of DA and observation periods. Our finding about the relationship between EX_OPT 
and AEM is consistent with Cheng and Warfield’s (2005) argument that equity incentives 
leading to earnings management arise from future trading in the company’s stock, and 
exercisable options involve no future trading in the company’s stock. 
We document a significant positive relationship between the average of CEO’s and 
CFO’s stock ownership (OWNER) as percentage of total outstanding shares and AEM during 
pre-SCA  and SCA periods, and no significant relationship between OWNER and AEM after the 
passage of SOX when DA > 0.  We find no significant relationship between OWNER and AEM 
during pre-SCA period, and significant positive relationship between OWNER and AEM during 
SCA and post-SOX periods when DA < 0.  In summary, our findings about the relationship 
between components of CEOs’ and CFOs’ compensation and AEM are consistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Cheng and Warfield 2005; Cohen et al. 2008; Healy 1985), and are theoretically 
sensible. 
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5.3 Robustness Tests 
5.3.1 Robustness Test: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficients 
To ensure that our finding about H1 is robust to the empirical model used, we do 
robustness test of H1 by using the model proposed in Lundholm and Myers (2002). The model 
proposed in Lundholm and Myers (2002) is also adapted from Collins et al. (1994), and has been 
widely used in prior studies (e.g., Choi et al. 2011; Orpurt and Zang 2009; Tucker and Zarowin 
2006). Consistent with prior studies, we control for firm size, sign of earnings, asset growth, 
institutional ownership, analysts following, and earnings volatility. Prior studies show that these 
firm-related characteristics affect price informativeness about future earnings. We refer readers 
to prior studies (e.g., Choi et al. 2011; Tucker and Zarowin 2006) for justifications of 
controlling-for these firm-related characteristics.  
However, firm size, institutional ownership, and analyst following are arguably 
associated with or related to stock liquidity. For instance, stock liquidity encourages the 
formation of large blockholdings and thus increases institutional ownership (Edmans et al. 2011), 
and analysts following is related to institutional holdings (Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995). 
While we acknowledge that firm size matters with respect to price informativenss about future 
earnigns we argue that we should care more about why firm size matters. Therefore, because of 
the centrality of stock liquidity as a microstructure mechanism contributing to price efficiency in 
our study we orthogonalize institutional ownership, and analyst following over stock liquidity 
before including them in the empirical model. The empirical model for robustness test of H1 is 
as follows: 
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Where, for fiscal year t and firm i,  
RETt = annualized stock return that starts from the fourth month after the end of 
fiscal year t-1. 
Et+j = the income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items for 
fiscal year t+j, j=-1, 0 deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning 
of fiscal year t. 
Et3 = the sum of income available to common shareholders before extraordinary 
items for fiscal years t+1 through t+3 deflated by the market value of equity at 
the beginning of fiscal year t. 
RETt3 =
   
the cumulative stock return over the three-year period that starts in the fourth 
month after fiscal year t. 
LIQt = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimate of bid-ask spread 
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 1 provides 
the details.  
AGt = growth rate of total assets from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
R_LMVt = the estimated residual from the following regression: LMVt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt 
+ εt where LMVt is the natural log of the market value of equity at the 
beginning of fiscal year t. 
STD_Et = the standard deviation of the income available to common shareholders before 
extraordinary items for fiscal years t through t+3. 
D_LOSSt = an indicator variable that equals one if Et3 < 0 and equals zero if otherwise. 
R_LCOVt = the estimated residual from the following regression: LCOVt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt 
+ εt where LCOVt is the natural log of (one plus the number of analysts 
following the firm in the three months prior to earnings announcement for 
fiscal year t). 
R_IOt = the estimated residual from the following regression: IOt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt + εt 
where IOt is the proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the end 
of the calendar quarter closest to the end of fiscal year t. 
 
H1 predicts that      . Table 4 reports the results of OLS estimate of equation (8). 
Consistent with the prediction of H1, we find that   ̂   . That is, our empirical finding about 
the validity of H1 is robust to the choice of a different empirical model. In addition, we draw 
Figure 3 by following the procedure used to draw Figure 1. Figure 3 reveals an empirical pattern 
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that is qualitatively similar to that revealed in Figure 1. That is, when stock liquidity is rather low 
contemporaneous variations in stock prices convey no information about changes in future 
earnings (fiscal year t+1 to t+3); as stock liquidity increases future earnings response coefficient 
increases. 
Table 4 
Robustness Test: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Lundholm and 
Myers 2002) 
 
 
 
 
Variables
Expected 
Sign
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept ? 0.072*  0.079*  
Et-1 - -0.925** -0.974**
Et + 0.689** 0.560**
Et3 + 0.560** 0.583**
RETt3 - -0.083** -0.081**
R_LMVt - -0.042** -0.041**
R_LMVt  × Et3 + 0.002    0.002    
AGt + 0.186** 0.179**
AGt  × Et3 - 0.013    0.011    
STD_Et ? 0.616** 0.675**
STD_Et  × Et3 - -0.395** -0.408**
D_LOSSt - -0.112** -0.099**
D_LOSSt  × Et3 - -0.671** -0.663**
R_LCOVt ? 0.038** 0.037**
R_LOVt  × Et3 + 0.040*  0.039*  
R_IOt ? 0.014    0.005    
R_IOt  × Et3 + 0.263** 0.269**
LIQt ? 0.027*  
LIQt  × Et-1 ? -0.057    
LIQt  × Et ? -0.215**
LIQt  × Et3 + 0.036**
N 93020    93020    
R
2 0.184    0.186    
Dependent Variable - RETt
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Table 4 
Robustness Test: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Lundholm and 
Myers 2002) - Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are calculated by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the robustness test of the relationship between stock liquidity and 
future earnings response coefficient by using the method proposed in Lundholm and Myers 
(2002). 
 
Variable Definitions: 
RETt = annualized stock return that starts from the fourth month after the end of 
fiscal year t-1. 
Et+j = the income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items for 
fiscal year t+j, j=-1, 0 deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning 
of fiscal year t. 
Et3 = the sum of income available to common shareholders before extraordinary 
items for fiscal years t+1 through t+3 deflated by the market value of equity at 
the beginning of fiscal year t. 
RETt3 =
   
the cumulative stock return over the three-year period that starts in the fourth 
month after fiscal year t. 
LIQt = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimate of bid-ask spread 
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 1 provides 
the details.  
AGt = growth rate of total assets from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
R_LMVt = the estimated residual from the following regression: LMVt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt 
+ εt where LMVt is the natural log of the market value of equity at the 
beginning of fiscal year t. 
STD_Et = the standard deviation of the income available to common shareholders before 
extraordinary items for fiscal years t through t+3. 
D_LOSSt = an indicator variable that equals one if Et3 < 0 and equals zero if otherwise. 
R_LCOVt = the estimated residual from the following regression: LCOVt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt 
+ εt where LCOVt is the natural log of (one plus the number of analysts 
following the firm in the three months prior to earnings announcement for 
fiscal year t). 
R_IOt = the estimated residual from the following regression: IOt = ß0 + ß1 * LIQt + εt 
where IOt is the proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the end 
of the calendar quarter closest to the end of fiscal year t. 
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Figure 3 
Robustness Analysis: Stock Liquidity and Future Earnings Response Coefficient (Lundholm and 
Myers 2002) 
 
Figure 3 depicts how future earnings response coefficient varies with the level of stock liquidity. 
 
5.3.2 Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Accruals-Based Earnings Management 
We run a battery of robust tests of H2. First, to ensure that our finding about H2 is not 
driven by the way in which we set up our regression model, we follow Cohen et al. (2008) to do 
the following two robustness tests: use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the 
dependent variable and run the regression separately for observations with positive and negative 
discretionary accruals. As evident in the results reported in the Panel A and Panel B of Table 5, 
estimates of regression coefficients and respective test statistics remain unchanged regardless of 
the way in which we set up the regression model for testing H2 and run the regression analysis. 
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We argue that the results reported in the Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 are not surprising 
because the flexibility inherent in the original regression setup already implies the results of 
these two robustness tests. 
We adopt alternative regression models of normal accruals to estimate discretionary 
accruals and examine whether our finding about H2 is robust to the way in which discretionary 
accruals are calculated. We use Dechow et al.’s (2003) (hereafter, DRT) model to estimate the 
normal level of total accruals (i.e. nondiscretionary accruals). DRT arguably improves the 
modified Jones model in several aspects. First, DRT explicitly models and thus captures the 
expected change in credit sales for a given change in sales rather than presumes that all credit 
sales are discretionary. Second, DRT includes lagged total accruals to control for the predicted 
proportion of total accruals. Third, DRT includes next-year’s sales growth to capture the increase 
in inventory that is related to growth prospects. We also use the original Jones model proposed in 
Jones (1991) to estimate the normal level of total accruals. As shown in results reported in Panel 
C and Panel D of Table 5, our finding regarding H2 remains unchanged.  
Instead of using two-digit SIC codes to classify the industry membership of firm-year 
observations we adopt the latest Fama-French industry classification scheme (49 industries in 
total) to estimate the modified Jones model. As shown in results reported in the Panel E of Table 
5, our finding about the empirical validity of H2 remains essentially unchanged 
To further ensure that our finding about H2 is not sensitive to our choice of stock 
liquidity measure, we adopt the stock liquidity measure proposed in Amihud (2002) and the 
stock liquidity measure proposed in Hasbrouck (2009) to rerun our main test of H2. Appendix 2 
provides brief technical background of each stock liquidity measure. As shown in the results 
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reported in Panel F and Panel G of Table 5, our finding regarding H2 remains unchanged 
regardless of the stock liquidity measures used. 
In summary, our finding about H2 is robust to the way in which we set up the regression 
model for testing H2, to the application of alternative total accruals models to estimate 
discretionary accruals, to the application of different industry classification schemes, and to the 
use of different stock liquidity measures. 
5.4 Causality Analysis: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals 
As evident in our review of the literature about the relationship between stock liquidity 
and price efficiency and in our development of H2, the relationship between stock liquidity and 
AEM is theoretically sound. However, the findings of prior studies suggest that there is possible 
reversal causality between stock liquidity and AEM. For instance, Lang et al. (Forthcoming) find 
that greater stock liquidity is associated with less earnings management. Moreover, endogeneity 
problems are ubiquitous in empirical studies. In our research setting, it is possible that third 
variables drive the empirical relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals 
documented by us. For example, Chung et al. (2010) find that greater stock liquidity is associated 
with better corporate governance. Chung et al. (2010) attributed their finding to the possibility 
that effective governance enhances financial and operational transparency, and thus decreases 
information asymmetries between insiders and outside investors as well as among outside 
investors. The findings of prior studies (e.g. Ghosh et al. 2010; Klein 2002) suggest that better 
corporate governance can mitigate accruals-based earnings management. Therefore, it is 
arguable that variation in underlying corporate governance may drive the empirical relationship 
between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals documented in our study. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals 
 
Panel A: Use of Absolute Value of DA (ADA) as Dependent Variable 
 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept 0.066** DDA 0.004    Intercept 0.070** 0.066**
BIG -0.001    DDA x BIG -0.005    BIG -0.006    -0.001    
ΔGDP 0.001    DDA x ΔGDP 0.002*  ΔGDP 0.003** 0.001    
LMV -0.001    DDA x LMV 0.001    LMV -0.000    -0.001    
Time -0.000    DDA x Time 0.002** Time 0.002** -0.000    
SCA 0.007    DDA x SCA -0.002    SCA 0.005    0.007    
SOX -0.003    DDA x SOX -0.015†  SOX -0.018** -0.003    
RM -0.032** DDA x RM 0.034** RM 0.002    -0.032**
BONUS -0.023    DDA x BONUS 0.036*  BONUS 0.013*  -0.023    
BONUS x SCA -0.089    DDA x BONUS x SCA 0.069†  BONUS x SCA -0.020    -0.089    
BONUS x SOX -0.004    DDA x BONUS x SOX 0.017    BONUS x SOX 0.013    -0.004    
UN_OPT 0.588    DDA x UN_OPT 0.470    UN_OPT 1.059** 0.588    
UN_OPT x SCA 1.267    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA -0.285    UN_OPT x SCA 0.983    1.267    
UN_OPT x SOX -0.736    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -0.699    UN_OPT x SOX -1.435** -0.736    
GRNT_OPT 0.673    DDA x GRNT_OPT 0.257    GRNT_OPT 0.930    0.673    
GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.076    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -0.175    GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.251†  -1.076    
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.155    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.201    GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.356    0.155    
EX_OPT 0.192    DDA x EX_OPT -0.037    EX_OPT 0.154    0.192    
EX_OPT x SCA -0.307    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA 0.145    EX_OPT x SCA -0.162    -0.307    
EX_OPT x SOX -0.432    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX 0.128    EX_OPT x SOX -0.304    -0.432    
OWNER -0.018    DDA x OWNER 0.136** OWNER 0.118** -0.018    
OWNER x SCA -0.144*  DDA x OWNER x SCA 0.112*  OWNER x SCA -0.032    -0.144*  
OWNER x SOX -0.071    DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.006    OWNER x SOX -0.077†  -0.071    
LIQ -0.044** DDA x LIQ 0.019** LIQ -0.025** -0.044**
N 20065    
R
2
0.095    
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
as the dependent variable. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
ADA = absolute value of DA. DA is the measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model 
proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the 
details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if 
otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm 
in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at 
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO 
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Panel B: Run the Regression Analysis Separately for Positive and Negative DA Observations 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that sorts 
observations into two groups according to the sign of discretionary accruals estimates and runs 
the regression separately for both groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept 0.070** -0.066**
BIG -0.006    0.001    
ΔGDP 0.003** -0.001    
LMV -0.000    0.001    
Time 0.002** 0.000    
SCA 0.005    -0.007    
SOX -0.018** 0.003    
RM 0.002    0.032**
BONUS 0.013*  0.023    
BONUS x SCA -0.020    0.089    
BONUS x SOX 0.013    0.004    
UN_OPT 1.059** -0.588    
UN_OPT x SCA 0.983    -1.267    
UN_OPT x SOX -1.435** 0.736    
GRNT_OPT 0.930    -0.673    
GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.251†  1.076    
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.356    -0.155    
EX_OPT 0.154    -0.192    
EX_OPT x SCA -0.178    0.307    
EX_OPT x SOX -0.287    0.432    
OWNER 0.118** 0.018    
OWNER x SCA -0.032    0.144*  
OWNER x SOX -0.077†  0.071    
LIQ -0.025** 0.044**
N 9335    10730    
R
2
0.073    0.100    
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Variable Definitions: 
 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones 
model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details. 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread 
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 trading 
days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the 
details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, 
and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year 
t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 
1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than 
or equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides 
the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation 
received by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end 
of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in 
fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled 
by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the 
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t 
scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Panel C: Adopt the Modified Jones Model Proposed in Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) to Estimate Discretionary Accruals 
 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept -0.070** DDA 0.133** Intercept 0.063** -0.070**
BIG 0.004    DDA x BIG -0.009    BIG -0.005    0.004    
ΔGDP -0.002** DDA x ΔGDP 0.004** ΔGDP 0.002** -0.002**
LMV 0.002†  DDA x LMV -0.003†  LMV -0.001    0.002†  
Time -0.001    DDA x Time 0.002†  Time 0.001*  -0.001    
SCA 0.000    DDA x SCA 0.000    SCA -0.001    0.000    
SOX 0.012    DDA x SOX -0.027*  SOX -0.015** 0.012    
RM 0.027** DDA x RM -0.028** RM 0.000    0.027**
BONUS 0.019    DDA x BONUS -0.008    BONUS 0.012*  0.019    
BONUS x SCA 0.062†  DDA x BONUS x SCA -0.076†  BONUS x SCA -0.014†  0.062†  
BONUS x SOX 0.003    DDA x BONUS x SOX -0.005    BONUS x SOX -0.002    0.003    
UN_OPT -0.365    DDA x UN_OPT 1.478*  UN_OPT 1.113** -0.365    
UN_OPT x SCA -0.637    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA 0.187    UN_OPT x SCA -0.449    -0.637    
UN_OPT x SOX 0.573    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -1.333†  UN_OPT x SOX -0.760    0.573    
GRNT_OPT -0.933†  DDA x GRNT_OPT 1.649†  GRNT_OPT 0.715    -0.933†  
GRNT_OPT x SCA 0.947    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -0.819    GRNT_OPT x SCA 0.128    0.947    
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.193    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX -0.018    GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.175    0.193    
EX_OPT -0.281    DDA x EX_OPT 0.479†  EX_OPT 0.197    -0.281    
EX_OPT x SCA 0.469    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA -0.712    EX_OPT x SCA -0.243    0.469    
EX_OPT x SOX 0.491    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX -0.773*  EX_OPT x SOX -0.282    0.491    
OWNER -0.001    DDA x OWNER 0.084*  OWNER 0.083** -0.001    
OWNER x SCA 0.115*  DDA x OWNER x SCA -0.079    OWNER x SCA 0.037    0.115*  
OWNER x SOX 0.095** DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.134*  OWNER x SOX -0.039    0.095**
LIQ 0.036** DDA x LIQ -0.059** LIQ -0.023** 0.036**
N 18218    
R
2
0.420    
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Panel C of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that adopts the modified Jones model proposed in 
Dechow et al. (2003) to estimate discretionary accruals. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (2003). 
Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the 
details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if 
otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm 
in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at 
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO 
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Panel D: Adopt the Jones Model Proposed in Jones (1991) to Estimate Discretionary Accruals 
 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept -0.065** DDA 0.145** Intercept 0.080** -0.065**
BIG 0.003    DDA x BIG -0.011    BIG -0.008    0.003    
ΔGDP -0.003*  DDA x ΔGDP 0.006*  ΔGDP 0.003** -0.003*  
LMV -0.000    DDA x LMV 0.001    LMV 0.001    -0.000    
Time 0.000    DDA x Time 0.002    Time 0.002** 0.000    
SCA -0.020    DDA x SCA 0.038    SCA 0.018†  -0.020    
SOX 0.000    DDA x SOX -0.019    SOX -0.019** 0.000    
RM 0.041** DDA x RM -0.032** RM 0.009†  0.041**
BONUS 0.012    DDA x BONUS 0.004    BONUS 0.016*  0.012    
BONUS x SCA 0.163    DDA x BONUS x SCA -0.182    BONUS x SCA -0.019    0.163    
BONUS x SOX 0.018    DDA x BONUS x SOX -0.016    BONUS x SOX 0.001    0.018    
UN_OPT -0.363    DDA x UN_OPT 1.273†  UN_OPT 0.911** -0.363    
UN_OPT x SCA -0.588    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA 2.569    UN_OPT x SCA 1.981†  -0.588    
UN_OPT x SOX 0.571    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -1.538†  UN_OPT x SOX -0.967*  0.571    
GRNT_OPT -1.096** DDA x GRNT_OPT 2.025*  GRNT_OPT 0.928    -1.096**
GRNT_OPT x SCA 1.456    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -2.659    GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.203    1.456    
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.881†  DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX -0.502    GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.379    0.881†  
EX_OPT -0.156    DDA x EX_OPT 0.487    EX_OPT 0.331    -0.156    
EX_OPT x SCA -0.055    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA -0.559    EX_OPT x SCA -0.614    -0.055    
EX_OPT x SOX 0.447    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX -0.361    EX_OPT x SOX 0.086    0.447    
OWNER -0.033    DDA x OWNER 0.133    OWNER 0.100** -0.033    
OWNER x SCA 0.189*  DDA x OWNER x SCA -0.183*  OWNER x SCA 0.005    0.189*  
OWNER x SOX 0.112    DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.169    OWNER x SOX -0.057    0.112    
LIQ 0.044** DDA x LIQ -0.068** LIQ -0.024** 0.044**
N 20065    
R
2
0.365    
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Panel D of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that adopts the Jones model proposed in Jones (1991) 
to estimate discretionary accruals. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the Jones model proposed in Jones (1991). Appendix 
1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz 
(2012) computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 
provides the details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if 
otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of 
the firm in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO 
held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by 
CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Panel E: Adopt the Industry Classification Scheme Proposed in Fama and French (1997) to Estimate Discretionary Accruals 
 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept -0.063** DDA 0.140** Intercept 0.077** -0.063**
BIG 0.000    DDA x BIG -0.010    BIG -0.009*  0.000    
ΔGDP -0.001    DDA x ΔGDP 0.005** ΔGDP 0.003** -0.001    
LMV 0.000    DDA x LMV 0.001    LMV 0.001    0.000    
Time 0.000    DDA x Time 0.001    Time 0.002** 0.000    
SCA -0.010†  DDA x SCA 0.011    SCA 0.001    -0.010†  
SOX 0.000    DDA x SOX -0.022*  SOX -0.021** 0.000    
RM 0.030** DDA x RM -0.028** RM 0.002    0.030**
BONUS 0.018    DDA x BONUS -0.010    BONUS 0.008    0.018    
BONUS x SCA 0.097†  DDA x BONUS x SCA -0.115    BONUS x SCA -0.018    0.097†  
BONUS x SOX 0.008    DDA x BONUS x SOX 0.008    BONUS x SOX 0.016    0.008    
UN_OPT -0.377    DDA x UN_OPT 1.386*  UN_OPT 1.009** -0.377    
UN_OPT x SCA -1.185    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA 2.134    UN_OPT x SCA 0.948*  -1.185    
UN_OPT x SOX 0.493    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -1.639*  UN_OPT x SOX -1.146** 0.493    
GRNT_OPT -1.017*  DDA x GRNT_OPT 1.886*  GRNT_OPT 0.868    -1.017*  
GRNT_OPT x SCA 1.436*  DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -2.836** GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.400*  1.436*  
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.211    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.126    GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.337    0.211    
EX_OPT -0.059    DDA x EX_OPT 0.241    EX_OPT 0.182    -0.059    
EX_OPT x SCA 0.155    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA -0.407    EX_OPT x SCA -0.252    0.155    
EX_OPT x SOX 0.208    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX -0.404    EX_OPT x SOX -0.196    0.208    
OWNER 0.010    DDA x OWNER 0.096    OWNER 0.106** 0.010    
OWNER x SCA 0.140** DDA x OWNER x SCA -0.172*  OWNER x SCA -0.032    0.140**
OWNER x SOX 0.072    DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.119    OWNER x SOX -0.047    0.072    
LIQ 0.044** DDA x LIQ -0.072** LIQ -0.028** 0.044**
N 20065    
R
2
0.416    
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Panel E of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that applies the industry classification scheme 
proposed in Fama and French (1997) to estimate discretionary accruals. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). 
Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the 
details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if 
otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm 
in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at 
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO 
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Panel F: Adopt the Liquidity Measure Proposed in Amihud (2002) 
 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept -0.071** DDA 0.145** Intercept 0.074** -0.071**
BIG 0.003    DDA x BIG -0.012†  BIG -0.009†  0.003    
ΔGDP 0.001** DDA x ΔGDP 0.001    ΔGDP 0.002** 0.001**
LMV 0.013** DDA x LMV -0.019** LMV -0.006** 0.013**
Time 0.000    DDA x Time 0.002** Time 0.002** 0.000    
SCA -0.019** DDA x SCA 0.029** SCA 0.010** -0.019**
SOX 0.010*  DDA x SOX -0.034** SOX -0.024** 0.010*  
RM 0.036** DDA x RM -0.036** RM -0.000    0.036**
BONUS 0.044** DDA x BONUS -0.038** BONUS 0.006    0.044**
BONUS x SCA 0.090*  DDA x BONUS x SCA -0.110** BONUS x SCA -0.020    0.090*  
BONUS x SOX -0.013    DDA x BONUS x SOX 0.032†  BONUS x SOX 0.019†  -0.013    
UN_OPT -0.805†  DDA x UN_OPT 1.973** UN_OPT 1.168** -0.805†  
UN_OPT x SCA -1.245    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA 2.073    UN_OPT x SCA 0.828    -1.245    
UN_OPT x SOX 0.819    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -2.330** UN_OPT x SOX -1.511** 0.819    
GRNT_OPT -1.013†  DDA x GRNT_OPT 2.147** GRNT_OPT 1.134** -1.013†  
GRNT_OPT x SCA 1.481    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -2.802†  GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.321    1.481    
GRNT_OPT x SOX -0.176    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.562    GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.387    -0.176    
EX_OPT -0.163    DDA x EX_OPT 0.369    EX_OPT 0.206    -0.163    
EX_OPT x SCA 0.405    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA -0.922†  EX_OPT x SCA -0.517    0.405    
EX_OPT x SOX 0.533    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX -0.711*  EX_OPT x SOX -0.178    0.533    
OWNER -0.024    DDA x OWNER 0.163** OWNER 0.139** -0.024    
OWNER x SCA 0.168** DDA x OWNER x SCA -0.239** OWNER x SCA -0.070    0.168**
OWNER x SOX 0.096*  DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.194** OWNER x SOX -0.098** 0.096*  
LIQ 0.005** DDA x LIQ -0.007** LIQ -0.002†  0.005**
N 20064    
R
2
0.390    
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
 
Panel F of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that adopts the liquidity measure proposed in 
Amihud (2002). 
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). 
Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the illiquidity measure proposed in Amihud (2002) computed over a period of 
252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or equal to 2002, and zero if 
otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and CFO of the firm 
in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal year t) that CEO and CFO held at 
the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of shares held by CEO 
and CFO at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Panel G: Adopt the Liquidity Measure Proposed in Hasbrouck (2009) 
 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept -0.065** DDA 0.134** Intercept 0.069** -0.065**
BIG 0.002    DDA x BIG -0.007    BIG -0.005    0.002    
ΔGDP 0.000    DDA x ΔGDP 0.003†  ΔGDP 0.003** 0.000    
LMV 0.003†  DDA x LMV -0.003†  LMV -0.001    0.003†  
Time -0.000    DDA x Time 0.003** Time 0.002** -0.000    
SCA -0.013†  DDA x SCA 0.019    SCA 0.006    -0.013†  
SOX 0.000    DDA x SOX -0.019†  SOX -0.019** 0.000    
RM 0.033** DDA x RM -0.031** RM 0.002    0.033**
BONUS 0.037*  DDA x BONUS -0.029    BONUS 0.007    0.037*  
BONUS x SCA 0.091    DDA x BONUS x SCA -0.109    BONUS x SCA -0.018    0.091    
BONUS x SOX -0.002    DDA x BONUS x SOX 0.018    BONUS x SOX 0.017†  -0.002    
UN_OPT -0.719    DDA x UN_OPT 1.859*  UN_OPT 1.140** -0.719    
UN_OPT x SCA -1.260    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA 2.119    UN_OPT x SCA 0.859    -1.260    
UN_OPT x SOX 0.824    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -2.228** UN_OPT x SOX -1.404** 0.824    
GRNT_OPT -0.957    DDA x GRNT_OPT 2.031†  GRNT_OPT 1.074†  -0.957    
GRNT_OPT x SCA 1.439†  DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -2.621*  GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.182†  1.439†  
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.080    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.021    GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.100    0.080    
EX_OPT -0.179    DDA x EX_OPT 0.370    EX_OPT 0.191    -0.179    
EX_OPT x SCA 0.315    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA -0.801    EX_OPT x SCA -0.487    0.315    
EX_OPT x SOX 0.451    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX -0.554    EX_OPT x SOX -0.103    0.451    
OWNER -0.009    DDA x OWNER 0.144*  OWNER 0.134** -0.009    
OWNER x SCA 0.158** DDA x OWNER x SCA -0.213** OWNER x SCA -0.055*  0.158**
OWNER x SOX 0.088†  DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.178*  OWNER x SOX -0.090*  0.088†  
LIQ 0.025** DDA x LIQ -0.041** LIQ -0.016** 0.025**
N 19969    
R
2
0.401    
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals - Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Panel G of Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the robustness test of H2 that adopts the 
liquidity measure proposed in Hasbrouck (2009). 
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model 
proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the effective trading cost measure proposed in 
Hasbrouck (2009) computed over a period of 252 trading days that ends in the 
last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, 
and zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 
1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or 
equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the 
details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received 
by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of 
fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal 
year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OPT = the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled 
by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the 
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t 
scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
 
To mitigate concerns with the possibility that our empirical finding about H2 is 
confounded by endogeneity problems, we incorporate firm / year / industry fixed effects and a 
long list of additional variables including governance-related variables identified from existing 
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literature into equation (4)
7
. In general, endogeneity problems are driven by omitted correlated 
variables (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). Firm fixed effects control for unobservable time-invariant 
sources of firm heterogeneity. That is, the fixed-effects method solves the joint determination 
problem wherein an unobservable time-invariant variable simultaneously determines both stock 
liquidity and discretionary accruals. Industry fixed effects control for industry varying effects on 
stock liquidity and discretionary accruals. We identify a long list of additional control variables 
by referring to prior studies (i.e. Badertscher 2011; Bebchuk et al. 2009; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; 
Chung et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2008; Zang Forthcoming). 
8
Prior studies suggest that these 
variables are either arguably related to or simply associated with AEM and/or stock liquidity. We 
provide the details including definitions, theoretical and empirical justification, and references in 
Appendix 3.  
The finding of Chung et al. (2010) suggests that corporate governance setup may be 
important omitted correlated “variables” because good corporate governance setup arguably 
constrains managers from engaging accruals-based earnings management and at the same time 
contributes to stock liquidity. Therefore, in our causality analysis, we need to control for 
variations in corporate governance. Because of the multi-dimension and context-contingency 
                                                          
7
 Though not perfect, our approach to dealing with endogeneity problem is pragmatically 
recommended (see Larcker and Rusticus 2010). Use of instrumental variable(s) is the other 
econometrically sound approach to dealing with endogeneity problems.  However, it is difficult 
to find an instrument variable that satisfies required econometrical conditions. Moreover, 
simulation results suggest that estimates based on instrument variables that only slightly violate 
required econometrical conditions may be “more biased and more likely to provide the wrong 
statistical inference” than those estimates that make no correction for endogeneity (see Larcker 
and Rusticus 2010). 
8
 Badertscher (2011) finds that use of accruals to manage earnings is affected by the degree of 
overvaluation. Badertscher (2011) measures the degree of overvaluation by the difference 
between market value and “fundamental” value derived from residual income model. In our 
study, we measure the degree of overvaluation by the cumulative stock returns of past three years. 
It is arguably sensible to presume that firms with high cumulative stock returns in the past are 
more likely to be overvalued. 
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nature of different corporate governance mechanisms (see Larcker et al. 2007), we refer to prior 
studies (i.e., Bechuk et al. 2009; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Chung et al. 2010) to identify the most 
“relevant” corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, we include governance measures 
related to CEO-Chair duality, director stock ownership, board size, board independence, audit 
committee independence, and entrenchment index developed in Bebchuk et al. (2009) in our 
causality test.  
To mitigate concerns with potential reverse causality, we measure stock liquidity as the 
natural logarithm of the inverse of high-low estimates of bid-ask spreads calculated over a period 
of 252 trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. The findings of Zang (2012) 
suggest that major decisions on AEM are generally made after fiscal year end. Therefore, there is 
generally a time lag between our measure of stock liquidity and firms’ decisions on AEM. We 
argue that in the presence of such a time lag, evidence supporting H2 cannot be simply attributed 
to reverse causality. In addition, we include the absolute value of discretionary accruals of fiscal 
year t-1 in the extended version of equation (4). If there were a reverse causality between stock 
liquidity and AEM, inclusion of the absolute value of discretionary accruals of fiscal year t-1 will 
further ensure that evidence supporting H2 cannot be simply attributed to reverse causality. 
Table 6 reports the OLS estimates of the extended version of equation (4). The finding 
generally supports H2. That is, there exists a negative relationship between stock liquidity and 
discretionary accruals when discretionary accruals are income-increasing and a positive 
relationship when discretionary accruals are income-decreasing. Surprisingly, the regression 
coefficient on LIQ is not statistically significant when DA < 0 even though the sign of the 
coefficient is consistent with the prediction of H2. We conjecture that the finding about the 
relationship between liquidity and DA when DA < 0 may be driven by certain features unique to 
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the limited sample used in the test as a result of requirement of availability of a long list of 
control variables.  
 
In summary, H2 empirically holds after controlling for firm industry fixed effects and a 
comprehensive list of covariates and taking into account potential reverse causality. Therefore, 
we argue that endogeneity issues and reverse causality may not drive our finding about H2. 
5.5 Additional Analysis: Trends of Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals 
Prior studies show that stock liquidity varies over time (e.g. Chordia et al. 2008). Given 
the strong cross-sectional evidence about the relationship between stock liquidity and AEM, we 
argue that it is interesting to examine whether AEM co-varies with overall stock liquidity over 
time. We draw Figure 4 to examine whether the time-series pattern of co-variation between stock 
liquidity and AEM is in line with H2. To draw Figure 4, we separate observations with negative 
discretionary accruals from those with positive discretionary accrual. H2 indicates that stock 
liquidity and discretionary accruals positively co-vary when DA < 0 and negatively co-vary 
when DA > 0. 
Figure 4 reveals several interesting patterns. First, consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) 
Figure 4 reveals that there is an overall trend of increase in AEM during the period of 1989-2000 
and that there is an overall trend of decrease in AEM during the period of 2002-2005. Second, 
Figure 4 shows that starting from 1997 stock liquidity and discretionary accruals co-vary closely 
as implied by H2, especially when DA < 0. 
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Table 6 
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals 
 
 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. Variables DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept 0.000    DDA 0.071** Intercept 0.072** 0.000    
BIG -0.042** DDA x BIG 0.009    BIG -0.033** -0.042**
ΔGDP 0.000    DDA x ΔGDP 0.001    ΔGDP 0.001*  0.000    
LMV -0.001    DDA x LMV 0.001    LMV 0.001    -0.001    
Time -0.001    DDA x Time 0.000    Time -0.000    -0.001    
SCA 0.008†  DDA x SCA 0.011†  SCA 0.019** 0.008†  
SOX 0.015** DDA x SOX -0.008    SOX 0.008    0.015**
BONUS -0.034    DDA x BONUS 0.018    BONUS -0.017    -0.034    
BONUS x SCA 0.001    DDA x BONUS x SCA -0.010    BONUS x SCA -0.009    0.001    
BONUS x SOX 0.020    DDA x BONUS x SOX -0.003    BONUS x SOX 0.017    0.020    
UN_OPT -1.521    DDA x UN_OPT 2.799    UN_OPT 1.278*  -1.521    
UN_OPT x SCA 1.949    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA -0.229    UN_OPT x SCA 1.721    1.949    
UN_OPT x SOX 1.585    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -4.191*  UN_OPT x SOX -2.606** 1.585    
GRNT_OPT -0.938    DDA x GRNT_OPT 1.865    GRNT_OPT 0.927    -0.938    
GRNT_OPT x SCA -0.205    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -3.123    GRNT_OPT x SCA -3.328*  -0.205    
GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.033    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX -1.031    GRNT_OPT x SOX -0.999    0.033    
EX_OPT 0.462    DDA x EX_OPT -0.773    EX_OPT -0.312    0.462    
EX_OPT x SCA -0.744    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA 0.742    EX_OPT x SCA -0.002    -0.744    
EX_OPT x SOX -0.166    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX 0.270    EX_OPT x SOX 0.104    -0.166    
OWNER -0.082    DDA x OWNER 0.135    OWNER 0.053    -0.082    
OWNER x SCA 0.053    DDA x OWNER x SCA -0.034    OWNER x SCA 0.019    0.053    
OWNER x SOX 0.103    DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.171†  OWNER x SOX -0.068    0.103    
AT 0.000** DDA x AT -0.000    AT 0.000** 0.000**
AT2 -0.000    DDA x AT2 -0.000    AT2 -0.000*  -0.000    
D_NOA 0.002    DDA x D_NOA -0.001    D_NOA 0.002    0.002    
OC -0.000†  DDA x OC -0.000    OC -0.000*  -0.000†  
PRM 0.221** DDA x PRM 0.015    PRM 0.236** 0.221**
RRM -0.075** DDA x RRM 0.004    RRM -0.071** -0.075**
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Table 6 
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals – Continued 
 
 
MS 0.015†  DDA x MS -0.005    MS 0.010    0.015†  
ZS -0.001*  DDA x ZS 0.001    ZS -0.000    -0.001*  
MTB -0.009    DDA x MTB -0.034    MTB -0.043*  -0.009    
IO -0.042** DDA x IO 0.015    IO -0.027*  -0.042**
ROA 0.568** DDA x ROA -0.229** ROA 0.339** 0.568**
MB -0.011** DDA x MB 0.003    MB -0.008** -0.011**
CC 0.003    DDA x CC -0.004    CC -0.000    0.003    
DO -0.328    DDA x DO 0.211    DO -0.117    -0.328    
DS 0.001    DDA x DS -0.002*  DS -0.001    0.001    
DI 0.007    DDA x DI -0.014    DI -0.006    0.007    
AI -0.015    DDA x AI 0.020†  AI 0.005    -0.015    
EI 0.001    DDA x EI -0.000    EI 0.000    0.001    
HI 0.047    DDA x HI -0.024    HI 0.023    0.047    
LCOV -0.009** DDA x LCOV 0.007*  LCOV -0.002    -0.009**
LIT 0.007    DDA x LIT -0.002    LIT 0.005    0.007    
SEO 0.006    DDA x SEO -0.010†  SEO -0.005    0.006    
MBE -0.018** DDA x MBE 0.010†  MBE -0.009** -0.018**
D_RET1 -0.003    DDA x D_RET1 0.003    D_RET1 0.000    -0.003    
D_RET2 -0.002    DDA x D_RET2 0.006    D_RET2 0.003    -0.002    
D_RET3 -0.006    DDA x D_RET3 0.005    D_RET3 -0.000    -0.006    
D_RET4 -0.015** DDA x D_RET4 0.016*  D_RET4 0.001    -0.015**
LEV 0.052** DDA x LEV -0.033*  LEV 0.019    0.052**
IC 0.001    DDA x IC -0.017    IC -0.016    0.001    
LCSHO 0.001    DDA x LCSHO -0.005    LCSHO -0.004    0.001    
ADA_P1 0.025    DDA x ADA_P1 0.061†  ADA_P1 0.087** 0.025    
LIQ 0.002    DDA x LIQ -0.017** LIQ -0.015** 0.002    
Industry Fixed Effects YES Industry Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects YES Firm Fixed Effects
N 5702    
R
2
0.789    
YES
YES
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Table 6 
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals – Continued 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
Table ? reports the OLS regression results of the causality test of H2 that includes firm and 
industry fixed effects, the absolute value of discretionary accruals of prior fiscal year, and a 
comprehensive list of control variables identified from the literature.  
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model 
proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise. 
LIQ = the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask spread 
proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 trading 
days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the details.  
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and 
zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 
1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or 
equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise. 
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received 
by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t. 
UN_OPT = the average number of un-exercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal 
year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_OP
T 
= the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled by 
total outstanding shares. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of 
fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
OWNER = the average stock ownership of CEO and CFO where stock ownership is the ratio 
of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the aggregate number of 
shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t to total outstanding 
shares of the firm. 
AT = the number of years that the auditor has audited the firm. 
AT2 = the square of AT. 
D_NOA = an indicator variable that equals one if the net operating assets (i.e., shareholders’ 
equity less cash and marketable securities plus total debt) at the beginning of 
fiscal year t divided by lagged sales is greater than the median of the 
corresponding industry-year, and zero if otherwise. 
OC = days receivable plus days inventory minus days payable at the beginning of 
fiscal year t. 
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Table 6 
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals – Continued 
 
PRM = the predicted component of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 
3 provides the details. 
RRM = the unexpected component of real activities-based earnings management. 
Appendix 3 provides the details. 
MS = the ratio of the firm’s sales to the total sales of its industry at the beginning of 
fiscal year t, where industry is defined on the basis of 3-digit SIC codes. 
ZS = z-score at the beginning of fiscal year t, where z-score is    
          
      
 
   
     
      
    
                 
      
    
               
     
 
   
                             
                 
. 
MTB = the marginal tax rate, defined and provided by Professor John Graham. 
IO = the percentage of institutional ownership in the calendar quarter that is closest to 
the end of fiscal year t. 
ROA = the return on assets, computed using net income for the rolling four quarters that 
ends in the third quarter of fiscal year t. 
MB = The ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
CC = an indicator variable that equals one if CEO is the chairman of the board of 
directors, and zero if otherwise. 
DO = the average stock ownership of board of directors. 
DS = the number of directors serving in the board of directors. 
DI = the percentage of independent directors in the board of directors. 
AI = the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee of the board of 
directors. 
EI = the entrenchment index developed in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) that is 
based on six provisions. Appendix 2 provides the details. 
HI = Herfindahl index, the sum of squares of the ratio of each firm’s sales to total sales 
in the same industry defined by three-digit SIC codes in year t-1. 
LCOV = the natural log of one plus the number of analysts following the firm in the three 
months prior to the earnings announcement. 
LIT = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is in a high litigation risk industry 
including biotechnology, computers, electronics, and retail. Appendix 3 provides 
the details. 
SEO = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm ever sells stocks in the next three 
fiscal years and equals zero if otherwise. 
MBE = the percentage of times of meeting/beating analysts’ forecast consensus in the past 
eight quarters. 
D_RETj = a dummy variable that indicates the membership of a firm-year observation in five 
equal groups generated according to the magnitude of cumulative stock returns 
over past three years where the group with lowest cumulative stock returns serves 
as the benchmark, j=1,2,3,4. 
67 
 
Table 6 
Causality Test: Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals – Continued 
 
LEV = the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
IC = the inverse of interest coverage ratio computed as the interest expense in fiscal year t 
divided by operating income before depreciation in fiscal year t-1. 
LCSHO = the natural log of total outstanding shares. 
ADA_P1 = the absolute value of discretionary accruals of fiscal year t-1. 
 
 
However, during the period of 1989-1996 the pattern of co-variation between stock 
liquidity and discretionary accruals is not consistent with the prediction of H2. We notice that 
during the period of 1989-1996 the overall stock liquidity is low. During the period of 1989-1996 
the tick size is $1/8 while tick size in late periods of my study is either $1/8 or $1/100. Tick size 
is found to be negatively related to stock market liquidity (Chordia et al. 2008). We conjecture 
that the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals may be empirically 
nonlinear rather than linear as presumed in our H2. Therefore, the nonlinear relationship between 
stock liquidity and discretionary accruals may account for the finding that the co-variation 
between liquidity and discretionary accruals is not consistent with the prediction of H2 during 
the period of 1989-1996 when stock liquidity is low. 
To examine whether the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals is 
empirically nonlinear, we first sort all firm-year observations into five equal groups according to 
the magnitude of stock liquidity and then generate four dummy variables to indicate the 
membership of each firm-year observation. Table 7 reports the OLS estimates of the modified 
version of equation (4) that uses the four dummy variables as measure of liquidity rather than the 
original liquidity measure. The results reported in Table 7 confirm our conjecture about the 
nonlinearity of the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals. We argue that 
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the nonlinearity of the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals may 
account for why the pattern of co-variation between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals is 
not consistent with the prediction of H2 during the period of 1989-2001 when stock liquidity is 
low. 
Cohen et al. (2008) attribute the decline in AEM during the period of 2002-2005 to the 
passage of SOX and other concurrent events such as high visibility of enforcement actions 
against offending corporate officers. However, we find it difficult to apply Cohen et al.’s (2008) 
argument to account for the close co-variation between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals. 
In other words, Cohen et al.’s (2008) argument may be used to justify the overall decline in 
AEM after 2002 but could not explain the overtime variation in AEM before and after 2002. Our 
finding about H2 provides an additional if not alternative explanation for overtime variation in 
AEM: that is, the overtime variation in stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency may drive the 
overtime variation in AEM. Our finding about H2 suggests that during the period of 2002-2005 
improvement in stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency may drive the overall decline in 
AEM
9
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 In 1997 the tick size of stock markets is reduced from $1/8 to $1/16; in 2001 the tick size of 
stock markets is reduced from $1/16 to $1/100. All these reductions in tick size are found to 
contribute to improvement in overall stock market liquidity (Chordia et al. 2008). 
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Panel A: DA > 0 
 
 
 
Panel B: DA < 0 
 
Figure 4 
Stock Liquidity and Discretionary Accruals: Time-Series Evidence 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts the over-time co-variation between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals. 
To draw Figure 4, each year we sort all observations into two groups according to the sign of 
their discretionary accruals and compute the means of stock liquidity and discretionary accruals 
separately. 
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Table 7 
Additional Test: the Nonlinearity of the Relationship between Stock Liquidity and Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
 
Note: t-statistics are computed by using two-way cluster-robust standard errors 
**, *, † Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a 2-tailed test 
 
Table 7 reports the OLS regression results of the additional test that examines the nonlinearity of 
the relationship between stock liquidity and discretionary accruals. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
DA = measure of discretionary accruals estimated by using the modified Jones model 
proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). Appendix 1 provides the details. 
DDA = an indicator variable that equals one if DA > 0, and zero if otherwise. 
Variables Coeff. Variables Coeff. DA > 0 DA < 0
Intercept -0.105** DDA 0.194** Intercept 0.089** -0.105**
BIG 0.001    DDA x BIG -0.008    BIG -0.006    0.001    
ΔGDP -0.001†  DDA x ΔGDP 0.005** ΔGDP 0.004** -0.001†  
LMV 0.001    DDA x LMV -0.001    LMV -0.000    0.001    
Time 0.000    DDA x Time 0.001    Time 0.002** 0.000    
SCA -0.009    DDA x SCA 0.015    SCA 0.006    -0.009    
SOX 0.003    DDA x SOX -0.021†  SOX -0.018** 0.003    
RM 0.032** DDA x RM -0.030** RM 0.002    0.032**
BONUS 0.029*  DDA x BONUS -0.018    BONUS 0.011*  0.029*  
BONUS x SCA 0.083    DDA x BONUS x SCA -0.102    BONUS x SCA -0.019    0.083    
BONUS x SOX -0.002    DDA x BONUS x SOX 0.017    BONUS x SOX 0.015    -0.002    
UN_OPT -0.610    DDA x UN_OPT 1.660*  UN_OPT 1.049** -0.610    
UN_OPT x SCA -1.091    DDA x UN_OPT x SCA 2.151    UN_OPT x SCA 1.060    -1.091    
UN_OPT x SOX 0.719    DDA x UN_OPT x SOX -2.165** UN_OPT x SOX -1.446** 0.719    
GRNT_OPT -0.739    DDA x GRNT_OPT 1.672    GRNT_OPT 0.933    -0.739    
GRNT_OPT x SCA 1.223    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SCA -2.457*  GRNT_OPT x SCA -1.234†  1.223    
GRNT_OPT x SOX -0.097    DDA x GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.456    GRNT_OPT x SOX 0.359    -0.097    
EX_OPT -0.198    DDA x EX_OPT 0.367    EX_OPT 0.169    -0.198    
EX_OPT x SCA 0.323    DDA x EX_OPT x SCA -0.749    EX_OPT x SCA -0.426†  0.323    
EX_OPT x SOX 0.439    DDA x EX_OPT x SOX -0.523    EX_OPT x SOX -0.084    0.439    
OWNER 0.010    DDA x OWNER 0.107†  OWNER 0.118** 0.010    
OWNER x SCA 0.162** DDA x OWNER x SCA -0.198** OWNER x SCA -0.035    0.162**
OWNER x SOX 0.078    DDA x OWNER x SOX -0.160*  OWNER x SOX -0.082*  0.078    
D1_LIQ 0.032** DDA x D1_LIQ -0.042** D1_LIQ -0.010    0.032**
D2_LIQ 0.046** DDA x D2_LIQ -0.067** D2_LIQ -0.021** 0.046**
D3_LIQ 0.055** DDA x D3_LIQ -0.082** D3_LIQ -0.027** 0.055**
D4_LIQ 0.061** DDA x D4_LIQ -0.097** D4_LIQ -0.036** 0.061**
N 20065    
R
2
0.410    
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Dx_LIQ = a dummy variable that indicates the membership of a firm-year observation in 
five equal group generated according to the magnitude of stock liquidity (LIQ) 
with the group with lowest stock liquidity serving as the benchmark group, 
where LIQ is the natural log of the inverse of the high-low estimates of bid-ask 
spread proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) computed over a period of 252 
trading days that ends in the last month of fiscal year t. Appendix 2 provides the 
details. x = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
BIG = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and 
zero if otherwise. 
ΔGDP = the percentage change in the real gross domestic product from year t-1 to year t. 
LMV = the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. 
TIME = a trend variable that equals the difference between the year of observation and 
1992. 
SCA = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is 2000 or 2001. 
SOX = an indicator variable that equals one if the year of observation is greater than or 
equal to 2002, and zero if otherwise. 
RM = measure of real activities-based earnings management. Appendix 1 provides the 
details.  
BONUS = the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received 
by the CEO and CFO of the firm in fiscal year t. 
EX_OPT = the average number of exercisable options that CEO and CFO held at the end of 
fiscal year t scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
UN_OPT = the average number of unexercisable options (excluding options grants in fiscal 
year t) that CEO and CFO held at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total 
outstanding shares of the firm.  
GRNT_
OPT 
= the average number of options granted to CEO and CFO in fiscal year t scaled 
by total outstanding shares. 
OWNER = the average of the sum of restricted stock grants in fiscal year t and the 
aggregate number of shares held by CEO and CFO at the end of fiscal year t 
scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Our study examines the effect of stock liquidity on the ability of stock prices to convey 
information about future earnings and accruals-based earnings management. In line with micro-
level evidence that stock liquidity improves price efficiency, we find that as stock liquidity 
increases the ability of stock prices to reflect future earnings increases as measured by future 
earnings response coefficients. Moreover, we find that stock prices convey information about 
future earnings only when stock liquidity is above certain threshold. Our finding about the effect 
of stock liquidity on stock price informativeness regarding future earnings is robust to adoption 
of different model specifications and use of different stock liquidity measures. Our finding about 
the relationship between stock liquidity and price informativeness as measured by future 
earnings response coefficients provides macro-level evidence about the effect of stock liquidity 
on price efficiency. 
We argue that stock liquidity and ensuing stock price efficiency dampen certain motives 
for firms and their managers to manage earnings will be dampened. Specifically, we argue that 
as stock liquidity increases and thus stock prices become more informative about firms’ 
economic fundamentals, managers will find it more difficult and thus less beneficial to 
manipulate investors’ perceptions of firms’ economic fundamentals through AEM. Moreover, 
both theories and empirical evidence suggest that as stock liquidity increases and consequently 
stock prices become more efficient (i) the sensitivity of managers’ pay to stock prices increase 
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1993; Jayaraman and Milbourn Forthcoming) and (ii) firms and their 
directors assign greater weight to stock price performance in their decisions about annual 
compensation for CEOs and top-paid executives (Banker and Datar 1989; David et al. 2011). 
Therefore, we argue that given two additional regularities: managerial attention and cognition are 
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strategically scarce and stock prices become more responsive to managers’ value creation efforts 
in a less biases manner as stock liquidity increases we can see that managers should rationally 
engage in less earnings management and allocate more efforts to value creation as stock liquidity 
increases and stock prices become more efficient. Furthermore, we argue that stock liquidity and 
ensuing price efficiency also reduce the demand for communication of managers’ private 
information through earnings management. In conclusion, we hypothesize that as stock liquidity 
increases firms engage in less AEM.  
Our finding confirms our hypothesized dampening effect of stock liquidity on AEM. Our 
finding about the dampening effect of stock liquidity and ensuing price efficiency on AEM is 
robust to chosen regression models of normal accruals, the industry classification schemes 
adopted to estimate normal accruals, and the use of different liquidity measures. Further analyses 
suggest that endogeneity issues and potential reverse causality may not drive our finding about 
H2. 
Stock liquidity varies over time. Our cross-section finding about the effect of stock 
liquidity on AEM suggests that over time variations in AEM may be driven by variations in 
stock liquidity and thus variations in overall stock price efficiency. Our additional analysis shows 
that when stock liquidity is not very low, AEM and stock liquidity closely co-vary over time as 
implied in our H2. Our finding about the co-variation of stock liquidity and AEM provides a 
market efficiency-based explanation of the decline in AEM during the period of 2002-2005 first 
documented in Cohen et al. (2008), and thus has important implication. 
In this study, we focus on the impact of stock liquidity on AEM. Actually, our argument 
about the effect of stock liquidity on AEM also applies to real-activities manipulation (see 
Edmans 2009). Real-activities manipulation generally involves sub-optimal real business 
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decisions, and therefore may have long-lasting negative economic effects. We welcome research 
that examines the impact of stock liquidity on real-activities manipulation. 
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APPENDIX 1: MEASURES OF ACCRUALS-BASED AND REAL ACTIVITIES-BASED 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
We identify three regression models from the accounting literature (i.e., Jones 1991 (J); 
Dechow et al. 1995 (DSS); Dechow et al. 2003 (DRT)) to estimate the normal levels of accruals. 
We estimate each regression model cross-sectionally within each industry-year over the period of 
1989 – 2010. The residuals from each regression model are our measure of accruals-based 
earnings management. In our main test of H2, we use residuals obtained from the modified Jones 
model proposed in Dechow et al. (1995). However, our findings about H2 still hold when we use 
residuals obtained from the original Jones model proposed in Jones (1991) or from the modified 
Jones model proposed in Dechow et al. (2003). We mainly define industry membership on the 
basis of two-digit SIC codes while our findings about H2 still hold when we adopt the industry 
classification scheme proposed in  Fama and French (1997).  
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Variable definitions: 
TACj,t = total accruals calculated by using the cash-flow approach (i.e., ibc – (oancf – 
xidoc), see Hribar and Collins (2002)) for fiscal year t. 
ΔSj,t = change in net sales (i.e., sale) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
Aj,t-1 = total assets (i.e., at) at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
ΔRECj,t = change in accounts receivable (i.e., rect) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
PPENTj,t = property, plan, and equipment (i.e., ppent) at the end of fiscal year t. 
PPEGTj,t = property, plan, and equipment (i.e., ppegt) at the end of fiscal year t. 
k = slope coefficient from a regression of ΔREC on ΔS (i.e., ΔRECi,t = a + kΔSi,t + 
εi,t) estimated within each year-industry.  
TACj,t-1 = total accruals calculated by using the cash-flow approach (i.e., ibc – (oancf – 
xidoc), see Hribar and Collins (2002)) for fiscal year t-1. 
Aj,t-2 = total assets (i.e., at) at the beginning of fiscal year t-1. 
ΔSj,t+1 = change in net sales (i.e., sale) from fiscal year t to fiscal year t+1. 
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Sj,t = net sales (i.e., sale) in fiscal year t. 
 
We estimate each regression model for any industry-year with at least fifteen 
observations. We report coefficients as the mean value of coefficients across industry-years. We 
calculate t-statistics by using the standard error of the mean value of coefficients across industry-
years. We report the adjusted R
2
 (number of observations) as the mean value of adjusted R
2
 
(number of observations) across industry-years. Our results are comparable to those of prior 
studies (e.g., Zang 2007, 2012).  
Panel A: Estimation of Normal Level of Total Accruals 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Accruals-Based Earnings Management 
 
Panel C: Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) Correlations 
 
 
SIC2 FF SIC2 FF SIC2 FF
α0 -0.526** -0.372** -0.347** -0.266** -0.039** -0.037**
β1 0.027** 0.039** 0.015** 0.025** -0.430** -0.360**
β2 -0.152** -0.170** -0.122** -0.130** 0.031** 0.042**
β3 0.223** 0.237** -0.046** -0.057**
β4 0.029** 0.017**
Adj. R
2
 (%) 37.95    34.52    45.79    42.68    28.90    28.48    
# of obs. 122.54    152.29    105.84    128.43    123.38    152.74    
# of industry-years 1084    881    945    789    1083    884    
DSS DRT J
Coefficients
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
DA - DSS - SIC2 -0.0204 0.2358 -0.0695 -0.0033 0.0574
DA - DSS - FF -0.0203 0.2359 -0.0704 -0.0034 0.0585
DA - DRT - SIC2 -0.0124 0.1737 -0.0579 -0.0008 0.0510
DA - DRT - FF -0.0121 0.1740 -0.0596 -0.0011 0.0520
DA - J - SIC2 0.0001 0.2977 -0.0488 0.0165 0.0808
DA - J - FF 0.0001 0.2965 -0.0500 0.0169 0.0814
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DA - DSS - SIC2 (1) 0.97 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.88
DA - DSS - FF (2) 0.93 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.91
DA - DRT - SIC2 (3) 0.86 0.83 0.96 0.79 0.77
DA - DRT - FF (4) 0.83 0.87 0.92 0.77 0.79
DA - J - SIC2 (5) 0.86 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.96
DA - J - FF (6) 0.81 0.87 0.74 0.78 0.89
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Following Zang (2012) we examine two types of real activities-based earnings 
management: overproducing inventory to reduce the cost of goods sold and increase earnings, 
and cutting discretionary expenditures (i.e., R&D, advertising, and selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenditures).  In line with prior studies (e.g., Badertscher 2011; Cohen 
et al. 2008; Zang Forthcoming), we follow the regression models proposed in Roychowdhury 
(2006) to estimate the abnormal level of production costs associated with overproduction of 
inventory, and the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures.  
 
       
      
      
 
      
   
    
      
   
     
      
   
       
      
          
 
       
      
      
 
      
   
      
      
          
 
 
Variable definitions: 
PRODj,t = the sum of the cost of goods sold (i.e., cogs) in fiscal year t and the change in 
inventory (i.e., invt) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
DISXj,t = the sum of R&D (i.e., xrd), advertising (i.e., xad), and SG&A (i.e., xsga) 
expenditures.  
Aj,t-1 = total assets (i.e., at) at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
Sj,t = net sales (i.e., sale) in fiscal year t. 
Sj,t-1 = net sales (i.e., sale) in fiscal year t-1. 
ΔSj,t = change in net sales (i.e., sale) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t. 
ΔSj,t-1 = change in net sales (i.e., sale) from fiscal year t-2 to fiscal year t-1. 
 
We estimate regression model (d) and (e) for any industry-year with at least fifteen 
observations. We report coefficients as the mean value of coefficients across industry-years. We 
calculate t-statistics by using the standard error of the mean value of coefficients across industry-
years. We report the adjusted R
2
 (number of observations) as the mean value of adjusted R
2
 
(number of observations) across industry-years. The residual from regression model (d) is the 
estimated amount of inventory overproduction (denoted as RM_PROD). That is, higher residuals 
indicate larger amount of inventory overproduction and greater earnings management through 
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reducing the cost of goods sold. The residual from regression model (e) is the estimated 
abnormal level of discretionary expenditures. We multiply the residuals from regression model 
(e) by negative one (denoted as RM_DISX) so that higher residuals suggest greater reduction of 
discretionary expenditures by firms to increase reported earnings. Consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Zang Forthcoming) we aggregate the two measures of real activities-based earnings 
management into one proxy (i.e., RM = RM_PROD + RM_DISX). Our results are comparable to 
those of prior studies (e.g., Zang Forthcoming). 
Panel A: Estimation of Normal Level of Discretionary Expenditures and Production Costs 
 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
 
 
Panel C: Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) Correlations 
 
SIC2 FF SIC2 FF
α0 0.147** 0.187** -0.088** -0.072**
β1 1.451** 1.021** 0.009    0.276**
β2 0.148** 0.135** 0.776** 0.741**
β3 -0.014    0.011    
β4 -0.029** -0.032**
Adj. R
2
 (%) 43.26    41.39    84.80    81.49    
# of obs. 118.23    141.71    114.66    143.91    
# of industry-years 1041    880    1063    856    
Coefficients
DISX PROD
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
RM - SIC2 -0.0190 0.5617 -0.1999 0.0369 0.2582
PROD - SIC2 -0.0401 0.3026 -0.1535 -0.0228 0.0888
DISX - SIC2 0.0211 0.3732 -0.0743 0.0525 0.1983
RM - FF -0.0209 0.5500 -0.1975 0.0372 0.2427
PROD - FF -0.0405 0.3006 -0.1521 -0.0242 0.0873
DISX - FF 0.0197 0.3655 -0.0737 0.0538 0.1859
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RM - SIC2 (1) 0.79 0.87 0.92 0.71 0.81
PROD - SIC2 (2) 0.80 0.37 0.72 0.90 0.34
DISX - SIC2 (3) 0.87 0.47 0.81 0.34 0.94
RM - FF (4) 0.89 0.71 0.77 0.78 0.86
PROD - FF (5) 0.71 0.89 0.43 0.80 0.36
DISX - FF (6) 0.76 0.41 0.88 0.86 0.46
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APPENDIX 2: STOCK LIQUIDITY MEASURES 
 
In our study, we adopt three liquidity measures: the high-low measure of effective spread 
(LIQ_HL) proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012), the Gibbs estimate of effective spread 
(LIQ_G) proposed in Hasbrouck (2009), and the price impact estimate (LIQ_A) proposed in 
Amihud (2002). All these three liquidity measures are computed from daily stock data provided 
by CRSP, and exhibit desirable statistical properties with respect to liquidity measures computed 
from intra-day transaction-level data (see Corwin and Schultz 2012; Goyenko et al. 2009; 
Hasbrouck 2009). In our main test of H2, we adopt LIQ_HL while our findings regarding H2 
still hold when using LIQ_G and LIQ_A as our stock liquidity measures.  
Corwin and Schultz (2012) developed their high-low measure on the basis of simple 
uncontroversial ideas. That is, daily high prices are always buyer-initiated while daily low prices 
are always seller-initiated. Therefore, the ratio of high-to-low prices reflect both the fundamental 
volatility of the stock and the stock’s bid-ask spread. Moreover, the component of the high-to-
low price ratio attributed to fundamental volatility increase proportionately with the trading 
interval while the component attributed to bid-ask spreads stay relatively constant over a short 
period. In other words, the price range over a two-day period reflects two days’ volatility and one 
bid-ask spread while the sum of the price ranges over two consecutive single days reflect two 
days’ volatility and twice the spread. Based on these simple insights, Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
first derived a function of the high-low price ratios on two consecutive single days and a function 
of the high-low ratio from a single two-day period and then applied these two functions to solve 
both the spread (S) and the variance (σ2). 
Analytically Corwin and Schultz (2012) showed  
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 Empirically, we estimate β and γ from stock return data and then numerically solve 
equation (a) to get    . After we get     we can refer to equation (b) to get α. Once we get α, we 
can refer to equation (c) to get empirical bid-ask spread S. Furthermore, Corwin and Schultz 
(2012) showed that under reasonable empirical conditions, we can get a closed-form solution for 
α. In our study, we adopt the closed-form solution for α to compute the high-low measure of 
effective spread. Readers can refer to Corwin and Schultz (2012) for the derivation and 
estimation details. The closed-form solution for α is as follows: 
  
√   √ 
   √ 
 √
 
   √ 
    
  Hasbrouck (2009) proposed his Gibbs sampler estimate of effective trading cost that is 
based on daily closing prices. The Gibbs sampler estimate is built on Roll’s (1984) model of 
security prices in a market with transaction costs. Roll (1984) modeled the price dynamics as 
mt = mt-1 + ut 
pt = mt + cqt 
where mt is the log quote midpoint prevailing prior to the t
th
 trade (i.e., efficient price), pt is the 
log trade price, and the qt are direction indicators that equal +1 for a buy or -1 for a sale with 
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equal probability. ut reflects public information uncorrelated with qt. We can view c as the 
effective cost because Roll’s model applies to transaction prices.  
Roll’s model implies 
Δpt = cΔqt + ut (e) and   √                where Cov(Δpt, Δpt-1) is the first-order auto-
covariance of price changes.  
 Hasbrouck’s Gibbs sampler estimate takes equation (e) as a linear regression and applies 
the Gibbs sampler developed in the context of Bayesian statistics to simulate the coefficients of 
the linear regression, the error covariance matrix, and the trade direction indicators. Interested 
readers can refer to Hasbrouck (2009, 1448-1455) for the details. Empirically, Hasbrouck (2009) 
extended Roll’s price dynamics model by including daily market return in equation (e). 
Hasbrouck (2009) argued that inclusion of daily market return in equation (e) can sharpen the 
allocation of transaction price changes between “true” (efficient price) returns and transient 
trading costs. 
 In our robustness test of H2, we also adopt the price impact measure proposed in Amihud 
(2002). Prior studies (e.g., Goyenko et al. 2009; Hasbrouck 2009) find that Amihud’s (2002) 
measure exhibits desirable statistical attributes in relation to transaction-level measure of price 
impacts. Amihud’s (2002) measure is defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to 
the dollar trading volume on that day, |Riyd|/VOLDiyd. Riyd is the return on stock i on day d of year 
y and VOLDiyd is the respective daily dollar volume. Amihud (2002) argued that his measure 
captures Kyle’s concept of illiquidity – the response of price to order flow (see Kyle 1985). The 
following formula captures the way in which we compute Amihud’s price impact measure: 
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where Diy is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in year y. 
 These three “liquidity” measures essentially capture stock illiquidity. Consistent with 
prior studies (e.g. Fang et al. 2009; Edmans et al. 2012) we use the natural log of the inverse of 
these three “illiquidity” measures as our measure of liquidity. Panel A of the following table 
reports the descriptive statistics for the illiquidity and the liquidity measures based on the high-
low, Gibbs sampler and Amihud approaches. To generate the following table, for the period of 
1970-2010, we compute the illiquidity measures over a period of 252 trading days that ends in 
the December of each year. After obtaining these illiquidity measures, we use the natural log of 
the inverse of these illiquidity measures as our measure of liquidity. Panel B of the following 
table reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations between these illiquidity and liquidity 
measures. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel B: Pearson (Upper Triangle) and Spearman (Lower Triangle) Correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
HL 0.018 0.022 0.006 0.011 0.021
Gibbs 0.011 0.015 0.003 0.006 0.013
Amihud 8.278 68.895 0.018 0.190 2.005
LIQ_HL 4.426 0.852 3.858 4.512 5.068
LIQ_G 5.017 1.001 4.314 5.108 5.761
LIQ_A 1.736 3.228 -0.696 1.663 4.033
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HL (1) 0.93 0.53 -0.81 -0.74 -0.59
Gibbs (2) 0.89 0.53 -0.78 -0.81 -0.66
Amihud (3) 0.68 0.79 -0.27 -0.25 -0.24
LIQ_HL (4) -1.00 -0.89 -0.68 0.91 0.69
LIQ_G (5) -0.89 -1.00 -0.79 0.89 0.79
LIQ_A (6) -0.68 -0.79 -1.00 0.68 0.79
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APPENDIX 3: ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE CAUSALITY TEST 
 
Variables  Definitions Justification References 
AT = the number of years that the auditor has audited 
the firm. 
The risk of not detecting errors as a result 
of unfamiliarity decreases with tenure. 
Zang (2012) 
Stice (1991) 
Myers et al. 
(2003) 
AT2 = the square of AT. Potential nonlinear relationship between 
auditor tenure and audit quality 
D_NOA = an indicator variable that equals one if the net 
operating assets (i.e., shareholders’ equity less 
cash and marketable securities plus total debt) at 
the beginning of fiscal year t divided by lagged 
sales is greater than the median of the 
corresponding industry-year, and zero if otherwise. 
Managers’ capability of managing earnings 
upward through accruals is constrained by 
accruals-based earnings management made 
in prior periods. 
Net operating assets proxy for the extent of 
accruals-based earnings management in 
prior periods. 
Zang (2012) 
Barton and 
Smiko (2002) 
OC = days receivable plus days inventory minus days 
payable at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
Firms with longer operating cycles have 
larger accruals accounts and wait a longer 
period for accruals to reverse. Therefore, 
firms with longer operating cycles have 
greater flexibility for accruals-based 
earnings management.  
Zang (2012) 
 
PRM = the predicted component of real activities-based 
earnings management.  
Managers use real activities-based and 
accruals-based earnings management as 
substitutes. 
Zang (2012) 
RRM = the unexpected component of real activities-based 
earnings management.  
MS = the ratio of the firm’s sales to the total sales of its 
industry at the beginning of fiscal year t, where 
industry is defined on the basis of 3-digit SIC 
codes. 
Accruals-based earnings management 
increases with costs associated with real 
activities-based earnings management. 
 Firms with larger market shares and 
their managers may consider real 
activities-based earnings 
management be relatively less 
Zang (2012) 
Graham et al. 
(2005) 
Bushee (1998) 
Roychowdhury 
(2006) 
ZS = z-score at the beginning of fiscal year t, where z-
score is 
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. 
costly. 
 Firms with poor financial health 
and their managers may perceive 
real activities-based earnings 
management more costly given 
concerns with survival and 
potential long-term negative impact 
of real activities-based earnings 
management. 
 The greater marginal tax rates, the 
relatively higher the net present 
value of tax costs associated with 
real activities-based earnings 
management. 
 The higher the proportion of 
institutional owners the greater the 
scrutiny by institutional investors 
and therefore the more difficult real 
activities-based earnings 
management.  
MTB = the marginal tax rate, defined and provided by 
Professor John Graham. 
 
IO = the percentage of institutional ownership in the 
calendar quarter that is closest to the end of fiscal 
year t. 
ROA = the return on assets, computed using net income 
for the rolling four quarters that ends in the third 
quarter of fiscal year t. 
Earnings management is related to firm 
performance. Return on assets (ROA) 
measures firm performance.  
Badertscher 
(2011) 
Zang (2012) 
MB = The ratio of market value of equity to the book 
value of equity. 
Need to control for firms’ growth rate. 
The ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity proxies for firms’ growth 
prospects.  
Zang (2012) 
CC = an indicator variable that equals one if CEO is the 
chairman of the board of directors, and zero if 
otherwise. 
Effective governance constrains earnings 
management and improves financial 
reporting transparency. As a result, firms 
with better corporate governance have 
greater stock liquidity because information 
asymmetries across investors are lower as a 
Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) 
Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) 
Chung et al. 
(2010) 
DO = the average stock ownership of board of directors. 
DS = the number of directors serving in the board of 
directors. 
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DI = the percentage of independent directors in the 
board of directors. 
result of better corporate governance.  
Effectiveness of corporate governance is 
shaped by 
 Board structure: directors’ 
ownership, board size, CEO-chair 
duality, director independence, 
independence of audit committee 
 Governance provisions: 
entrenchment index 
Leuz et al. 
(2003) 
 AI = the percentage of independent directors in the 
audit committee of the board of directors. 
EI = the entrenchment index developed in Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) that is based on six 
provisions. Appendix 2 provides the details. 
HI = Herfindahl index, the sum of squares of the ratio 
of each firm’s sales to total sales in the same 
industry defined by three-digit SIC codes in year t-
1. 
The greater industry competition the more 
costly real activities-based earnings 
management.  
Badertscher 
(2011) 
Zang (2012) 
LCOV = the natural log of one plus the number of analysts 
following the firm in the three months prior to the 
earnings announcement. 
The greater the number of analysts 
following a firm the greater the monitoring 
by analysts and therefore more constraints 
on accruals-based earnings management. 
Badertscher 
(2011) 
Zang (2012) 
LIT = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is 
in a high litigation risk industry including 
biotechnology, computers, electronics, and retail. 
Appendix 3 provides the details. 
Firms competing in high litigation risk 
industries tend to engage less in accruals-
based earnings management.  
Badertscher 
(2011) 
Francis et al. 
(1994) 
SEO = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
ever sells stocks in the next three fiscal years and 
equals zero if otherwise. 
Firms tend to manage earnings when 
planning to have SEOs in the near future.  
Teoh et al. 
(1998) 
MBE = the percentage of times of meeting/beating 
analysts’ forecast consensus in the past eight 
quarters. 
Firms with consistent MBE performance in 
the past have a stronger incentive to 
manage earnings.  
Bartov et al. 
(2002) 
Kasznik and 
McNichols 
(2002) 
D_RETj = a dummy variable that indicates the membership 
of a firm-year observation in five equal groups 
generated according to the magnitude of 
cumulative stock returns over past three years 
Firms with overvalued stocks tend to 
manage earnings. 
Past cumulative stock performance 
reasonably captures the extent to which 
Jensen (2005) 
Badertscher 
(2011) 
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where the group with lowest cumulative stock 
returns serves as the benchmark, j=1,2,3,4. 
firms’ stocks are overvalued.  
LEV = the ratio of total debt to total assets. Firms manage earnings to avoid debt 
covenant violations.  
Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) 
IC = the inverse of interest coverage ratio computed as 
the interest expense in fiscal year t divided by 
operating income before depreciation in fiscal year 
t-1. 
LCSHO = the natural log of total outstanding shares. It will be more difficult for firms to 
manage earnings to achieve desired 
earnings per share when the number of 
shares outstanding is greater.  
Zang (2012) 
ADA_P1 = the absolute value of discretionary accruals of 
fiscal year t-1. 
Less earnings management leads to greater 
transparency and therefore greater 
liquidity.  
Chung et al. 
(2010) 
Lang and 
Maffett (2011) 
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